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Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories

International Linkage and the Organizational Power of Incumbents

This book explains the diverging competitive authoritarian regime paths during the post–Cold War period. As noted in Chapter 1, we divide post–Cold War (1990–2008) regime trajectories into three categories: (1) *democratization*, in which autocrats fell and their successors governed democratically; (2) *stable authoritarianism*, in which autocratic governments or chosen successors remained in power through at least three terms[1]; and (3) *unstable authoritarianism*, in which autocrats fell from power but their successors did not govern democratically. Our central question, therefore, is why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized after 1990, while others remained stable and authoritarian and still others experienced one or more transitions without democratization.

Our explanation combines a domestic structuralist approach to regime change with insights from recent work on the international dimension of democratization. Whereas earlier studies of regime change – ranging from the structuralist theories of the 1960s and 1970s to the agency-centered literature of the 1980s – focused overwhelmingly on domestic variables,[2] widespread democratization after the Cold War compelled scholars to take seriously the international environment.[3] The spatial and temporal clustering of third- and fourth-wave

[1] We also code as stable cases in which incumbents remain in power for at least two terms but three full terms had not yet been completed as of December 31, 2008.

[2] Classical regime analyses that focused on domestic variables include Lipset (1959/1981), Almond and Verba (1963), Moore (1966), and O'Donnell (1973). In the most influential agency-centered analysis of the 1980s, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 18) concluded that it "seems fruitless to search for some international factor or context which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization, much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse."

[3] On the international dimension of democratization, see Huntington (1991), Pridham (1991a), Starr (1991), Diamond (1992, 1995), Whitehead (1996a), Pridham et al. (1997), Grugel (1999a), Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Gleditsch (2002), Schraeder (2002a), Kelley (2004), Levitsky and Way (2005, 2006), Mainwaring and Perez Liñan (2005), Pevehouse (2005), Vachudova (2005b), and Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

transitions convinced even leading proponents of domestic-centered approaches that it was "time to reconsider the impact of the international context upon regime change."[4] The debate thus turned from *whether* international factors matter to *how much* they matter. Some scholars posited the primacy of external factors, arguing that international effects outweigh those of domestic variables.[5] In this view, international pressure may so decisively change actor calculations that "the influence of many traditionally important domestic variables may be mitigated."[6] Other scholars argued that the international environment plays a secondary role,[7] or that its effects are largely superficial, yielding "virtual" or "artificial" democracies.[8]

We offer a somewhat different perspective on this debate. Rather than assert the primacy of either international or domestic factors, we argue that their relative causal weight varies, in predictable ways, across countries and regions.[9] In states with extensive ties to the West, post–Cold War international influences were so intense that they contributed to democratization even where domestic conditions were unfavorable. In these cases, we concur with those who posit the primacy of international variables. However, where ties to the West were less extensive, post–Cold War international pressure was weaker, and consequently, domestic factors weighed more heavily. In these cases, regime outcomes are explained primarily by domestic structural variables, particularly the strength of state and governing-party organizations.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION: LINKAGE AND LEVERAGE

Analyses of the international dimension of democratization proliferated in the post–Cold War era. These studies point to at least five distinct mechanisms of international influence.[10] The first is *diffusion*, or the "relatively neutral transmission of information" across borders, via either demonstration effects in neighboring countries or modeling on successful democracies.[11] Facilitated by the spread of new information and communication technologies,[12] diffusion is said to account for the "wave-like" temporal and regional clustering of democratic transitions.[13]

4 Schmitter (1996: 27).

5 See Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Gleditsch (2002), Kelley (2004), Pevehouse (2005), and Vachudova (2005b).

6 Pevehouse (2005: 209). See also Vachudova (2005b).

7 See Linz and Stepan (1996) and Bratton and van de Walle (1997).

8 On "virtual democracies," see Joseph (1999b); on "artificial" democracies, see Pinkney (1997: 216).

9 Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Gleditsch (2002), and Brinks and Coppedge (2006) make similar arguments.

10 For summaries of the various mechanisms of international influence, see Diamond (1993, 1995), Schmitter (1996), Whitehead (1996a), Grugel (1999b), Burnell (2000b), and Schraeder (2003).

11 Whitehead (1996b: 5–8). On diffusion, see Huntington (1991), Starr (1991), Drake (1998), O'Loughlin et al. (1998), Schmitz and Sell (1999), Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Gleditsch (2002), Starr and Lindberg (2003), Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

12 On the role of the Internet, see Ferdinand (2000), Simon (2002a, 2002b), and Kalathil and Boas (2003).

13 See Huntington (1991), Starr (1991), O'Loughlin et al. (1998), Gleditsch (2002), Bunce and Wolchik (2006a, b), Brinks and Coppedge (2006), and Beissinger (2007).

A second mechanism of international influence is *direct democracy promotion* by Western states, particularly the United States.[14] Here, the primary force for regime change is "efforts by the world's most powerful liberal state to promote democracy abroad,"[15] via diplomatic persuasion, threats, and – in a few cases (e.g., Haiti, Panama, and Serbia) – military force.

A third mechanism of international influence is *multilateral conditionality*, in which external assistance or membership in international organizations is linked to countries' democratic or human-rights performance.[16] Forms of conditionality range from negative conditionality – or the withdrawal of external assistance to recalcitrant autocrats – to positive or membership conditionality employed by regional organizations such as the EU. The EU offered aid and extensive integration into Western Europe in exchange for far-reaching political, administrative, and economic reform.[17]

A fourth mechanism is external *democracy assistance*.[18] Western governments, party foundations, and international organizations dramatically increased funding in the 1990s for civic-education programs, electoral assistance, legal and legislative reform, and independent media and civic organizations.

Finally, *transnational advocacy networks* constitute a fifth mechanism of external influence.[19] Human-rights, democracy, and election-monitoring NGOs grew rapidly in size, number, and influence during the 1980s and 1990s. These organizations drew international attention to human-rights violations, electoral fraud, and other violations of international norms, and they lobbied Western governments to take punitive action in response to them.[20]

Despite this heightened scholarly attention, however, the relationship between the international environment and regime change remains poorly understood. Two problems are worth noting. First, there has been little effort to either adjudicate among the various mechanisms of international influence cited previously or integrate them into a coherent theoretical framework.[21] Most studies either simply present a laundry list of the various mechanisms of international influence or limit the focus to a single mechanism.

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[14] Whitehead (1996b: 8–15) calls this democratization "by control." See Carothers (1991), Lowenthal (1991), Smith (1994), Robinson (1996), Whitehead (1996c), Peceny (1999), Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi (2000), Rose (2000), von Hippel (2000), and Schraeder (2002a).

[15] Peceny (1999: 185). See also von Hippel (2000).

[16] See Nelson and Englinton (1992), Stokke (1995a), Crawford (2001), Zielonka and Pravda (2001), Linden (2002), Clinkenbeard (2004), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), and Vachudova (2005b).

[17] On EU conditionality, see Pridham (1991a; 2005), Pridham, Herring, and Sanford (1997), Jacoby (2004), Kelley (2004), Pevehouse (2005), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), Vachudova (2005b).

[18] See Diamond (1995), Carothers (1999, 2000b), Ottaway and Chung (1999), Elklit (1999), Burnell (2000a, 2000b), Ottaway and Carothers (2000), and Ethier (2003). U.S. funding for democracy-assistance programs "took off" in the 1990s (Burnell 2000b: 39–44), increasing from near zero in the early 1980s to $700 million at the turn of the century (Carothers 1999: 6; Burnell 2000b: 49).

[19] On transnational human-rights networks, see Sikkink (1993), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999), Florini (2000), and Orenstein and Schmitz (2006).

[20] Keck and Sikkink (1998); Risse and Sikkink (1999).

[21] For a similar critique, see Pevehouse (2005: 204).

Second, many analyses of international democratizing pressure give insufficient attention to how it varies – in both character and intensity – across cases and regions.[22] For example, democratic diffusion has been shown to be "spatially dependent."[23] Thus, diffusion effects were far more pronounced in the Americas and Eastern Europe than in Asia and the former Soviet Union.[24] Regional variation was also manifested in Western efforts to promote democracy: Whereas Western powers invested heavily in democracy promotion in Eastern Europe and Latin America during the 1990s, democracy promotion was trumped by "power politics" in much of Asia[25]; in Africa, democracy promotion was largely "rhetorical."[26] The effectiveness of political conditionality also varied by region: Whereas EU membership conditionality was relatively effective,[27] conditionality had only a limited democratizing impact in Africa.[28] Finally, the impact of transnational advocacy networks varied by region: Human-rights networks exerted greater influence in Eastern Europe and Latin America during the 1990s,[29] whereas Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan African states were "severely underrepresented" in these networks.[30]

In summary, the international dimension was decidedly thicker in some regions (Eastern Europe and Latin America) than others (Africa and the former Soviet Union) in the post–Cold War period.[31] To capture and explain this variation and to integrate the large number of seemingly disparate mechanisms of international influence into a concise theoretical framework, we organize the post–Cold War international environment into two dimensions: *Western leverage* and *linkage to the West*.[32]

Western Leverage

Western leverage may be defined as governments' vulnerability to external democratizing pressure. Our conceptualization of leverage encompasses both (1) regimes' bargaining power vis-à-vis the West,[33] or their ability to avoid

[22] An exception is the literature on diffusion. On regional variation in international influences, see Whitehead (1996e: 395–6), Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Gleditsch (2002), Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan (2003, 2005), Brinks and Coppedge (2006), and Orenstein and Schmitz (2006).

[23] Kopstein and Reilly (2000: 1–2); see also Starr (1991), O'Loughlin et al. (1998), Gleditsch (2002: 4–5), and Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

[24] Starr (1991); Chu, Hu, and Moon (1997); Prizel (1999); Whitehead (1999); Kopstein and Reilly (2000).

[25] See Inoguchi (2000).

[26] Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 241); Diamond (1999: 55–6).

[27] Linden (2002); Kelley (2004); Pevehouse (2005); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); Pridham (2005); Vachudova (2005b).

[28] Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 182, 219); Roessler (2005: 210–11).

[29] Sikkink (1993: 435–6); Risse and Ropp (1999: 240); Kumar (2000: 137); Smith and Wiest (2005).

[30] Florini and Simmons (2000: 7).

[31] See Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Gleditsch (2002), Mainwaring and Pérez Liñan (2003, 2005), and Pevehouse (2005).

[32] Stallings (1992) used the terms *linkage* and *leverage* in her analysis of international influences on economic policy.

[33] Our treatment of "the West" is highly aggregated. It is obvious that Western powers do not always act in a monolithic way. EU and

Western action aimed at punishing abuse or encouraging political liberalization; and (2) the potential impact (in terms of economic health or security) of Western punitive action toward target states. Leverage thus refers not to the exercise of external pressure, per se, but rather to a country's vulnerability to such pressure.[34] Where countries lack bargaining power and are heavily affected by Western punitive action, leverage is high; where countries possess substantial bargaining power and/or can weather Western punitive action without significant harm, leverage is low.

Leverage is rooted in three factors.[35] The first and most important factor is the size and strength of countries' states and economies. Governments in weak states with small, aid-dependent economies (e.g., much of sub-Saharan Africa) are more vulnerable to external pressure than those of larger countries with substantial military and/or economic power (e.g., China and Russia). These latter states have the bargaining power to prevent pressure from being applied; therefore, the various types of pressure employed by Western powers – such as aid withdrawal, trade sanctions, and the threat of military force – are less likely to inflict significant damage.

Second, leverage may be limited by competing Western foreign-policy objectives. Where Western powers have countervailing economic or strategic interests at stake, autocratic governments often possess the bargaining power to ward off external demands for democracy by casting themselves – and regime stability – as the best means of protecting those interests.[36] Thus, Western powers have exerted little democratizing pressure on major energy producers (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) or states that are deemed strategically important (e.g., Egypt and Pakistan). In such cases, efforts to take punitive action often divide Western governments, thereby diluting the effectiveness of those efforts.[37]

Third, leverage may be reduced by the existence of what Hufbauer et al. call "black knights," or counter-hegemonic powers whose economic, military, and/or diplomatic support helps blunt the impact of U.S. or EU democratizing pressure.[38] Russia, China, Japan, and France played this role at various times during the post–Cold War period, using economic, diplomatic, and other assistance to shore up authoritarian governments in neighboring (or, in the case of France, former colonial) states. Examples include Russia's support for autocrats in Belarus and France's support for autocrats in former colonies such as Cameroon and Gabon. In Eastern Europe and the Americas, by contrast, no significant countervailing power existed during the post–Cold War period. For countries in those

U.S. policies differed during the post–Cold War period, and their own policies were often inconsistent across cases and over time. As Kopstein (2006) notes, the EU and the United States have often employed distinct democracy-promotion strategies. However, EU and U.S. policies toward competitive authoritarian regimes were sufficiently coherent after 1989 to merit theorizing about the West as a unitary actor.

[34] This definition thus differs from that used by Vachudova (2005b), who treats leverage as the actual exercise of political and economic pressure.

[35] For operationalization of leverage, see Appendix II.

[36] Nelson and Eglinton (1992: 20) and Crawford (1997: 87).

[37] Crawford (2001: 211–27).

[38] See Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990: 12).

regions, the EU and the United States were effectively the "only game in town," which heightened the vulnerability of those countries to Western democratizing pressure.

Leverage raised the cost of building and sustaining authoritarianism during the post–Cold War period. Where leverage was high, autocratic holdouts were frequent targets of Western democratizing pressure.[39] External punitive action often triggered fiscal crises, which – by eroding incumbents' capacity to distribute patronage and to pay salaries of civil servants and security personnel – seriously threatened regime survival. Indeed, even the threat of punitive action or – in the case of Eastern Europe – the promise of external reward may powerfully shape autocratic behavior. Thus, Western pressure at times has played a major role in toppling authoritarian regimes (e.g., Haiti and Serbia) or forcing them to liberalize (e.g., Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, and Nicaragua); in blocking or rolling back coups (e.g., Guatemala, Haiti, and Paraguay) or stolen elections (e.g., the Dominican Republic, Serbia, and Ukraine); and in dissuading governments from stealing elections in the first place (e.g., Romania and Slovakia).

Yet leverage alone rarely translated into effective democratizing pressure, for several reasons. First, Western democracy-promotion strategies (with the exception of EU membership conditionality) were markedly "electoralist," in that they focused on holding multiparty elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties.[40] Thus, whereas coups and other blatant acts of authoritarianism often triggered strong Western responses, "violations that are less spectacular yet systematic tend[ed] to be left aside."[41] Even in internationally monitored elections, incumbents often got away with harassment of opponents, abuse of state resources, near-total control over the media, and substantial manipulation of the vote.[42] Moreover, Western pressure tended to ease up after the holding of multiparty elections, even if the elections did not result in democratization.[43]

Electoralism was exacerbated by difficulties in monitoring and enforcing conditionality. Although external pressure may be effective for easily monitored "one-shot" measures, such as the holding of elections, it is less effective at guaranteeing other aspects of democracy, such as civil liberties and a level electoral field.[44] Outside of the EU, the mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement required to impose the full package of democracy were largely absent. Hence, it is not surprising that cross-national studies have found that political conditionality had little impact on regime outcomes during the post-Cold War period.[45] Even in

[39] Nelson and Eglinton (1992: 20); Crawford (2001: 210–27).

[40] On "electoralism," see Karl (1986). See also Diamond (1999: 55–6).

[41] Stokke (1995b: 63).

[42] See Geisler (1993), Carothers (1997b), and Lawson (1999).

[43] During the mid-1990s, for example, autocratic governments in Armenia, Georgia, Kenya, Mozambique, Peru, Tanzania, and Zambia faced little external pressure after elections were held.

[44] Nelson and Eglinton (1992: 35); Stokke (1995b: 63–7); Ottaway (2003).

[45] According to one study, conditionality made a "significant contribution" to democratization in only 2 of 29 cases in the 1990s (Crawford 2001: 187). See also Nelson and Eglinton (1992), Stokke (1995b), and Burnell (2000b: 26–7).

sub-Saharan Africa, where Western leverage is perhaps greatest, scholars have found no positive relationship between conditionality and democratization.[46]

Leverage alone thus generated blunt and often ineffective forms of external pressure during the post-Cold War period. Even where political conditionality was applied, autocrats frequently enjoyed considerable room to maneuver. Although compelled to hold elections, they often got away with minimal reforms that fell short of democracy – for example, adopting multipartyism without guaranteeing civil liberties or a level playing field.[47] In other words, leverage was sometimes sufficient to force transitions from closed to competitive authoritarianism but it was rarely sufficient to induce democratization.

Linkage to the West

The second dimension, *linkage*, is central to understanding variation in the effectiveness of international democratizing pressure during the post–Cold War period. We define linkage to the West as the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) among particular countries and the United States, the EU (and pre-2004 EU members), and Western-dominated multilateral institutions.[48] Linkage is a multidimensional concept that encompasses the myriad networks of interdependence that connect individual polities, economies, and societies to Western democratic communities.[49] Six dimensions are of particular importance:[50]

- *economic linkage*, or flows of trade, investment, and credit
- *intergovernmental linkage*, including bilateral diplomatic and military ties as well as participation in Western-led alliances, treaties, and international organizations
- *technocratic linkage*, or the share of a country's elite that is educated in the West and/or has professional ties to Western universities or Western-led multilateral institutions
- *social linkage*, or flows of people across borders, including tourism, immigration and refugee flows, and diaspora networks

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46 Bratton and van de Walle (1997).

47 Carothers (1997a, 1999, 2000a); Joseph (1999a, 1999b); Ottaway (2003: 193–4).

48 This discussion draws on the work of Whitehead (1991, 1996b, 1996d, 1996e), Pridham (1991b), and Kopstein and Reilly (2000).

49 This conceptualization draws on Keohane and Nye's (1989: 33–4) work on "complex interdependence," a central characteristic of which is "multiple channels of contact among societies." However, whereas Keohane and Nye focus on linkage *among* Western powers, we examine countries' ties *to* Western powers. Our conceptualization of linkage is broadly similar to those of Rosenau (1969b), Pridham (1991b, 1991c), and Stallings (1992). It also is comparable to Scott's (1982) use of "informal penetration," Li's (1993) use of "penetration," and Kopstein and Reilly's (2000) use of "flows." Our conceptualization differs from international-relations work on "linkage diplomacy," which has been defined as government attempts to project power "from an area of strength to secure objectives in areas of weakness" (Oye et al. 1979: 13; Haas 1980; Stein 1980; Li 1993).

50 For operationalization of linkage, see Appendix III.

- *information linkage*, or flows of information across borders via telecommunications, Internet connections, and Western media penetration
- *civil-society linkage*, or local ties to Western-based NGOs, international religious and party organizations, and other transnational networks

Linkage is rooted in a variety of historical factors, including colonialism, military occupation, and geopolitical alliances. It is enhanced by capitalist development – which increases cross-border economic activity, communication, and travel – as well as by sustained periods of political and economic openness. However, the most important source of linkage is geographic proximity.[51] Proximity "induces interdependence among states" and creates "opportunity for interaction."[52] Countries that are geographically proximate to the United States and the EU, such as those in the Caribbean Basin and Eastern Europe, generally have closer economic ties; more extensive diplomatic contacts; and larger cross-border flows of people, organizations, and information than countries in less proximate areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa or the former Soviet Union.[53]

Linkage serves as a transmitter of international influence. Many international effects that are commonly described as "global" are, in fact, rooted in concrete ties – networks; organizations; and flows of people, information, and resources – among states.[54] Thus, research on diffusion suggests that it is facilitated by "intensive and long-term contacts,"[55] which are rooted in networks of communication and flows of people and resources.[56] Similarly, transnational pressure has a greater impact where NGO networks are "strong and dense" and interstate relations are characterized by extensive interaction.[57] In short, many "globalizing" forces are not felt evenly across the globe. Post–Cold War demonstration effects, "CNN effects," and "boomerang" effects were most pronounced in countries with extensive ties to the West. Where ties to the West were minimal, these external influences were "weaker and more diffuse."[58]

Linkage contributed to democratization in three ways during the post–Cold War period: (1) it heightened the international reverberation caused by autocratic abuse; (2) it created domestic constituencies for democratic norm-abiding behavior; and (3) it reshaped the domestic distribution of power and resources, strengthening democratic and opposition forces and weakening and isolating autocrats. These mechanisms are *material* rather than normative or ideational.

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[51] See Kopstein and Reilly (2000), Gleditsch (2002), and Brinks and Coppedge (2006).

[52] Gleditsch (2002: 4–5).

[53] Although linkage varies with region, the two are far from perfectly correlated. Some cases – Taiwan is a clear example – exhibit far greater linkage than their regional position would lead us to expect. Moreover, one finds considerable variation within each region. In East Asia, for example, cases range from high (Taiwan) to medium (Malaysia) to low linkage (Cambodia). Although the Americas is generally a high-linkage region, several cases within it score as medium linkage (e.g., Haiti and Peru).

[54] Gleditsch (2002: 13).

[55] Bostrom (1994: 192).

[56] Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Brinks and Coppedge (2006); Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010).

[57] Risse-Kappan 1995a: 30–1; 1995b: 286–7); Keck and Sikkink (1998: 206).

[58] Whitehead (1996e: 395–6). See also Kopstein and Reilly (2000).

Although linkage may facilitate the diffusion of ideas and norms,[59] it also has a powerful impact on actors' interests, incentives, and capabilities. We focus on these latter effects.

Shaping Incentives: International Reverberation and the Cost of Government Abuse

Linkage heightens the international reverberation triggered by government abuse, thereby raising the cost of such abuse. Extensive media, intergovernmental, and NGO penetration, as well as flows of people and information, increases the level of external monitoring so that acts of fraud or repression are more likely to become news in Western capitals. The activities of transnational NGO networks, exile communities, and multilateral organizations have an amplifying effect, turning what otherwise would be a minor news item into an international scandal.[60] In such a context, even relatively minor abuse may gain substantial attention in the West. Thus, whereas stolen elections in Armenia, Cameroon, and Gabon went virtually unnoticed in the U.S. media during the 1990s, fraud in Mexico's *gubernatorial* elections gained widespread U.S. media coverage in 1991.[61] Likewise, the 1994 Zapatista uprising attracted a massive influx of international media and human-rights organizations to Southern Mexico, and the army's initial attempt to repress the Zapatistas "inspired an overwhelming reaction from civic groups throughout the United States."[62] In Eastern Europe, a dense array of multilateral organizations resulted in a level of detailed monitoring not seen in other parts of the world.[63] For example, the Slovak government was once cited for violating *informal* parliamentary norms of committee assignment.[64] By contrast, where Western media and international nongovernmental organization (INGO) penetration is weak, even egregious abuse often fails to make international headlines. Thus, in parts of Africa, even regimes that "rely overwhelmingly on violence and exclusionary tactics . . . manage to slip almost completely beneath the radar of the international media."[65] Likewise, months after the 2005 massacre of more than 100 protesters by Uzbek security forces, even Western regional experts knew "very little" about what had happened.[66]

Linkage also increases the probability that – all else being equal – Western governments will take action in response to reported abuse. Extensive media coverage and lobbying by INGOs, exile and diaspora communities, and religious and party networks often generates a "do-something" effect that puts

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[59] See Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999), Beissinger (2002, 2007), Bunce and Wolchik (2006a, 2006b), Orenstein and Schmitz (2006), and Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010).

[60] Risse and Sikkink (1999: 18).

[61] Dresser (1996b: 332).

[62] Kumar (2000: 117); see also Dresser (1996b: 334).

[63] Pridham (2002, 2005); Schimmelfennig (2002).

[64] Vachudova (2005b: 158).

[65] Joseph (2003: 160).

[66] Oral presentation by Victoria Clement, "Yellow Revolution? Recent Referendums and Elections in Central Asia," at the conference "Shades of Revolution: Democratization in the Former Soviet Union," University of Illinois, 12 September 2005. See also *The Economist*, October 1, 2005: 39–40.

pressure on Western governments to act.[67] In Haiti, for example, lobbying by refugee organizations, human-rights groups, and the Congressional Black Caucus helped convince the Clinton Administration to take action against the military regime.[68]

Western governments are also more likely to take action in high-linkage cases because they perceive direct interests to be at stake. For the United States and EU members, the potential social, political, and economic effects of instability in the Caribbean Basin and Eastern Europe are greater than those of instability in sub-Saharan Africa or most of the former Soviet Union. For example, threats of regional instability and refugee flows caused by Serbia's proximity to Western Europe explains why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) opted for a military response in Kosovo but took little action in response to similar or worse crises (in terms of refugees and internal displacement) in Afghanistan, Angola, and Sudan.[69] Similarly, the domestic impact of refugee flows encouraged Western intervention in Haiti (1994) and Albania (1997). In the former case, "the impact of seeing so many small boats on the television screens of average homes in the United States became too stark for Washington to ignore"[70]; in the latter case, "[t]he Albanian problem became an Italian problem" as the Italian press "kept Albanian events on the front page for months."[71]

Where linkage is less extensive, the probability of a Western response is lower. For example, due to limited media coverage, weak political ties, and the relative weakness of Africa-oriented lobbies and human-rights networks, Western governments have felt little pressure to take action against autocratic abuse in sub-Saharan Africa.[72] Because U.S. politicians view it as "politically unwise to incur the possibility of alienating their constituencies by focusing on Africa," even severe problems – such as the civil war in Congo – have often "failed to rise to the level of a policy-making crisis" in Washington.[73] A similar pattern can be seen in the former Soviet Union; for example, there existed relatively little pressure on Western governments to respond to Russian human-rights abuses in Chechnya or the 2005 massacre of unarmed protestors in Uzbekistan.[74]

In summary, linkage increases the probability that government abuse will gain the attention of – and trigger responses by – Western powers, thereby narrowing autocrats' room to maneuver. In such a context, even leaders who engage in relatively minor abuse, such as Mečiar in Slovakia, are likely to be tagged as rogue autocrats, even though they are often less repressive than governments in low-linkage countries that are accepted – and even embraced – by the West (e.g., Ethiopia and Uganda in the 1990s).

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67 von Hippel (2000: 102–103).

68 Malone (1998: 166); I. Martin (1999: 725–6).

69 Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000: 194).

70 Ballard (1998: 77–8). See also von Hippel (2000: 102).

71 Belloni and Morozzo della Rocca (2008: 182). See also Johnson (2001).

72 Moss (1995: 198–9); Shraeder (2001: 391–4).

73 Schraeder (2001: 392).

74 On the Western response to Russian abuse in Chechnya, see Cornell (1999); Goldgeier and McFaul (2003: 138–44).

Shaping Interests: Creating Domestic Constituencies for Democratic Behavior

Linkage also shapes the distribution of domestic preferences, increasing the number of domestic actors with a stake in adhering to regional or international democratic norms. Where linkage is extensive, a plethora of individuals, firms, and organizations maintain personal, financial, or professional ties to the West. Because international isolation triggered by flawed elections, human-rights abuses, or other violations of democratic norms would put these ties – and, consequently, valued markets, investment flows, grants, job prospects, and reputations – at risk, internationally linked actors have a stake in avoiding such behavior. For example, regional economic integration increases the number of businesses for whom a sudden shift in trade or foreign-investment flows would be costly. These economic actors have a stake in their governments' adherence to regional democratic norms.[75] As a European official describing the effect of integration stated:

> You can never prevent an adventurer trying to overthrow the government if he is backed by the real economic powers, the banks and the businesses. But once in the [European] Community, you create a network of interests for those banks and businesses . . . ; as a result, those powers would refuse to back the adventurer for fear of losing all those links.[76]

This dynamic was apparent in the Dominican Republic, where – despite a severe political–economic crisis in the early 1990s – business leaders opposed a coup out of fear that it would "hurt the country's economic prospects, affect tourism, and impact relations with the United States."[77]

A similar logic applies to technocrats with ties to Western universities, INGOs, and international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Not only are technocrats sensitive to developments abroad, but they also often aspire to funding from or positions in Western universities or IOs in the future.[78] Fearing the professional or reputational costs of association with a norm-violating government, they are more likely to advocate reforms that improve the country's international standing and oppose government actions that risk international rebuke. Likewise, ties to the West may induce ruling-party politicians to seek to reform those parties from within, as occurred in Croatia, Macedonia, Mexico, and Taiwan, or to defect to the opposition, as occurred in Slovakia in the mid-1990s.[79] Linkage may even shape voter preferences. Citizens who expect integration with Europe or the United States to bring prosperity are likely to vote against parties whose behavior appears to threaten the process

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75 Pridham (1991c: 220–5); Pevehouse (2005).

76 Quoted in Pridham (1991c: 235).

77 Hartlyn (1993: 166).

78 For example, Mexican President Carlos Salinas aspired to be President of the World Trade Organization after his term ended (Kaufman 1999: 185). His successor, Ernesto Zedillo, became head of Yale University's Center for the Study of Globalization after leaving the presidency. Similarly, Ganev (2006: 79) argues that adherence to European norms in Bulgaria was motivated in part by "the prospect of moving up the trans-European bureaucratic ladder and eventually landing well-paid jobs in Brussels."

79 Vachudova (2005b: 161, 163, 172).

of integration. Thus, oppositions in Croatia and Slovakia focused their election campaigns on a promise to end their countries' relative estrangement from the EU.[80]

Linkage thus creates domestic constituencies for adherence to regional and international norms. By heightening domestic actors' sensitivity to shifts in a regime's image abroad, linkage blurs international and domestic politics, transforming international norms into domestic demands. When much of the elite perceives that it has something to lose from international isolation, it is more difficult to sustain a coalition behind authoritarian rule. For example, Serbia's increasing isolation from the West in the late 1990s led key military and security officials to defect, which undermined Milošević's ability to crack down on opposition protest.[81] Likewise, when President Fujimori's 1992 coup threatened Peru's reintegration into the international financial system, technocrats and business allies convinced him to abandon plans for dictatorship and call early elections.[82] By contrast, in Armenia, Belarus, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe – where Western-linked elites were less numerous and influential – authoritarian coalitions remained cohesive in the face of criticism and even isolation from the West.

Shaping the Distribution of Power and Resources

Linkage also reshapes domestic-power balances in ways that favor democratization. First, ties to the West help to protect opposition leaders and groups who otherwise would be vulnerable to repression. Because individuals who gain Western media attention and have influential allies in the West are more difficult to kill or imprison, governments in high-linkage contexts are often forced to tolerate voices of criticism and opposition that they otherwise might have silenced. For example, although the Mexican army possessed the coercive capacity to destroy the Zapatista rebels, international media attention and the presence of thousands of international human-rights observers "made it literally impossible for the Mexican government to use repression" against them.[83] Likewise, in Romania, international criticism brought about by intense European engagement in the early 1990s helped convince the Iliescu government to cease government-sponsored violence by coal miners.[84]

Second, ties to Western governments, transnational party networks, international agencies, and INGOs may provide critical resources to opposition and prodemocracy movements, helping to level the playing field against autocratic governments. Where autocrats monopolize access to the media and sources of finance, opposition parties are often so starved of resources that they cannot mount effective national electoral campaigns. External ties may help compensate for these resource asymmetries by providing assistance to opposition parties, independent media, and human rights and election monitoring groups. Intense Western engagement may also help encourage fragmented oppositions to unite.[85] Thus, in Slovakia, support from the EU and European party networks helped a

[80] Vachudova (2005b: 177); Fisher (2006).
[81] Cohen (2001a: 214); Bujosevic and Radovanovic (2003: 24–6).
[82] Mauceri (1996: 89).
[83] Castells (1997: 80).
[84] Vachudova (2005b: 102).
[85] Vachudova (2005b); Fisher (2006).

weak and fragmented opposition defeat Mečiar in 1998;[86] in Serbia, U.S. and European assistance helped level the playing field by financing independent media, opposition activists' salaries, and a massive get-out-the-vote campaign;[87] and in Nicaragua, where a weak and fragmented opposition stood little chance of wresting power from the Sandinistas on its own, U.S. officials helped unify anti-Sandinista forces, select a presidential candidate, and run a national election campaign.[88] In East Asia, by contrast, opposition party ties to the West are weaker,[89] and power and resource asymmetries have often been more difficult to overcome.[90]

Third, ties to the West may enhance domestic support for democratic opposition groups. Western media penetration heightens citizen awareness of their country's international standing – and its consequences. In such a context, opposition politicians who enjoy close ties to the West may gain prestige and support, either because they are identified with valued Western ideals or because they can credibly claim an ability to improve their country's international standing (e.g., by securing EU entry or improving relations with the United States). Thus, in Nicaragua, where the Sandinista government suffered a costly U.S.-sponsored war and trade embargo, the National Opposition Union's ties to the United States allowed it to "claim with confidence that if it won the election, the United States would end its economic embargo . . . and open the floodgates of U.S. economic assistance," which proved to be a critical source of electoral support.[91] At the same time, linkage may erode domestic support for autocratic incumbents. Leaders whose pariah status is perceived to threaten their countries' regional or international standing may pay a significant cost in terms of domestic support. In Slovakia, for example, most voters and politicians viewed Vladimir Mečiar as an obstacle to European integration – a goal that enjoyed broad public support.[92] Not only was Mečiar's pariah status a major issue in the 1998 election, but it also undermined his party's ability to find coalition partners with which to form a government.[93]

Finally, linkage may alter the balance of power *within* autocratic parties, helping to strengthen reformist tendencies. In Croatia, for example, widespread frustration with international isolation and strong ties to the European People's Party helped reformists wrest control of the Croatian Democratic Union from radical nationalists after the death of Franjo Tuđman.[94] Linkage also strengthened the hand of reformist factions in the Mexican PRI and Taiwanese KMT.

Linkage effects are often indirect and diffuse. Linkage influences a variety of state and nonstate actors, generating multiple and often decentralized forms of pressure that may operate below the radar screens of outside observers. Thus,

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86 Pridham (1999a: 1229–30).
87 Carothers (2001).
88 López Pintor (1998: 41–4).
89 See Sachsenroder (1998: 13).
90 See Gomez (2002a) and Rodan (2004).
91 Moreno (1995: 240); see also Anderson and Dodd (2004: 152–4).
92 Vachudova (2005b: 174–5); Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel (2005: 40); Fisher (2006).
93 Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel (2003: 515). Pariah politics also played a role in Croatia and Romania, where the EU discouraged alliances with parties that were viewed as nondemocratic, and governments pushed those parties out of ruling coalitions.
94 Houghton and Fisher (2008: 450).

although scholars have rightly attributed democratic successes in Eastern Europe and the Americas to external pressure by the EU and the United States, the intensity and efficacy of such measures was rooted, to a considerable degree, in linkage.[95]

Three final points about linkage are worth noting. First, linkage has a "cluster" effect; that is, it is the cumulative impact of a diversity of ties that is critical to shaping political outcomes. Thus, it is only where ties to the West are extensive on all (or nearly all) dimensions – as opposed to being concentrated in one or two dimensions (e.g., economic ties to Persian Gulf states or Western ties to opposition groups in ex-Soviet states) – that we should observe the linkage effects described above.[96]

Second, linkage and leverage may overlap, and when both are high, they can be difficult to disentangle. In Eastern Europe, for example, many of the institutions created by the EU accession process simultaneously enhanced linkage and served as mechanisms of external pressure. Moreover, because linkage raises the cost of international norm-violating behavior for individual actors (e.g., lost business, professional, or funding opportunities), it also may be viewed as a form of leverage. Nevertheless, the analytic distinction between linkage and leverage is important: Not only do cases vary considerably along both dimensions (compare the Dominican Republic and Slovakia, where linkage and leverage are high, to Cambodia and Malawi, where leverage is high but linkage is low), but – as we demonstrate – this variation also matters for regime outcomes.

Third, not all linkage is Western. A few of our cases are characterized by substantial social, economic, or political ties to important non-Western states (e.g., China and Russia) or communities (e.g., the international Islamic community). Where these ties are strong, they can be expected to shape how governments respond to Western pressure. The existence of a significant non-Western audience may blunt the impact of ties to the West. Indeed, in a few of our cases, extensive *non-Western linkage* appears to have had such an effect. In Malaysia, for example, social, political, and civil-society ties to the international Muslim community increased the UMNO government's sensitivity to developments in the Muslim world and countered the political influence of Western actors.[97] In Belarus and Ukraine, ties to Russia – rooted in the Soviet era – similarly blunted the impact of Western pressure.

Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization

Although linkage and leverage both raised the cost of authoritarianism in the post–Cold War era, they did so in distinct ways and to different degrees. As noted previously, leverage alone generates inconsistent and superficial democratizing

[95] Pridham (1991b) and Whitehead (1991, 1996d, 1996e, 1996f) make similar arguments.

[96] The clustered nature of linkage makes it difficult to isolate the effect of a particular dimension relative to others. Thus, membership in regional or international organizations may facilitate democratization (Pevehouse 2005), but only because it is embedded within dense social and information ties.

[97] Nair (1997).

pressure. Where linkage is low, external monitoring and sanctioning is usually limited to elections and large-scale human-rights violations, which leaves autocrats with greater room to maneuver. Even where external pressure succeeds in removing autocrats from power, transitions may not result in democracy. Without extensive ties to the West – and usually facing little domestic pressure – new governments have weaker incentives to play by democratic rules. Indeed, low-linkage transitions frequently have ushered in new autocratic governments.[98]

Where linkage is high, leverage is more likely to generate pressure for full democratization. Linkage enhances the democratizing impact of leverage in at least three ways. First, it improves external monitoring by increasing information flows concerning even minor democratic abuses. In a context of extensive penetration by international media, INGOs, and multilateral organizations, authoritarian governments face intense scrutiny. Crucially, this scrutiny extends beyond elections to include civil liberties, media freedom, and other democratic procedures – in other words, the full package of democracy. Moreover, monitoring tends to be permanent rather than limited to crises or election cycles. Consequently, Western attention is less likely to wane after elections are held and/or autocrats are removed.

Second, linkage increases the probability that Western states actually will use leverage for democratizing ends. Because authoritarian abuse is more likely to reverberate in Western capitals and trigger demands for a response, norm-violating governments are more likely to suffer punitive action. In other words, the "boomerang effect" discussed by scholars of transnational advocacy networks is more likely to be triggered in a context of extensive linkage.

Third, linkage magnifies the *domestic* impact of external pressure by increasing the likelihood that it will trigger broad domestic opposition. Because economic elites, politicians, technocrats, and voters are more aware of how their country is perceived abroad and more likely to believe that they have something to lose from international isolation, norm-violating governments confront a *double boomerang effect*: Abuse triggers hostile reactions on both the international and domestic fronts (Figure 2.1). For example, after Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano's 1993 "self-coup" was condemned by the U.S. government, the "threat of international . . . isolation loomed in the minds of both economic and military elites, both of which valued their international contacts." Indeed, "fear of the international consequences of allowing the coup to stand" led them to mobilize against Serrano and ultimately oust him.[99]

Linkage also increases the likelihood that authoritarian collapse will lead to stable democratization. In a high-linkage context, successor governments have stronger and more permanent incentives to play by democratic rules. First, in nearly all cases, officials in successor governments maintained close ties to Western actors that were forged during periods of opposition. In Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and elsewhere, opposition leaders relied heavily on Western allies for resources, protection, and legitimacy. In some cases, their domestic public support was rooted in a promise to

[98] Examples include Belarus, Georgia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova, and Zambia.

[99] Pevehouse (2005: 190–2).



FIGURE 2.1. Linkage and the "double boomerang" effect.

deliver better relations with the West. Once these opposition leaders came to power, they were unlikely to "bite the hand" that helped get them there.[100] Second, because the infrastructure of international monitoring remains in place, new governments generally face the same level of scrutiny as their autocratic predecessors. Hence, even former opposition leaders who are not committed to democracy face strong pressure to behave democratically.

Where linkage is low, by contrast, opposition groups have weaker ties to the West and – in the absence of an infrastructure of media, NGOs, and other transnational actors – new governments enjoy greater room to maneuver. As long as domestic prodemocracy forces are weak, then, they have few incentives to play by fully democratic rules. Consequently, transitions are more likely to bring new nondemocratic governments to power (e.g., Georgia and Zambia); where regimes democratize (e.g., Benin and Mali), they are more vulnerable to authoritarian reversal.

In summary, the democratizing impact of Western leverage varies with linkage. In the absence of linkage, external pressure is often too limited and inconsistent to bring stable democratization. Where linkage is high, external pressure is more effective in both bringing down autocrats and ensuring stable democratization.

The dimensions of leverage and linkage thus help us understand cross-national variation in international pressure for democratization.[101] As shown in Table 2.1,

[100] Examples include Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua, Emil Constantinescu in Romania, Mikulas Dzurinda in Slovakia, Leonel Fernández in the Dominican Republic, and Alejandro Toledo in Peru.

[101] See Levitsky and Way (2005, 2006).

TABLE 2.1. *How Variation in Linkage and Leverage Shapes External Pressure for Democratization*

	High Linkage	**Low Linkage**
High Leverage	Consistent and intense democratizing pressure	Often strong, but intermittent and "electoralist," pressure
Low Leverage	Consistent but diffuse and indirect democratizing pressure	Weak external pressure

different combinations of leverage and linkage create distinct external environments. Across these environments, the relative influence of domestic and international factors varies considerably.

Where linkage and leverage are both high, as in much of Eastern Europe and the Americas, external democratizing pressure is consistent and intense. Violations of democratic norms routinely gain international attention and trigger costly punitive action, which is often magnified by opposition among domestic constituencies. In such a context, autocracies are least likely to survive and turnover is most likely to bring democratization. It is in these cases, therefore, that international influences are most pronounced. Democratization is likely even where domestic conditions are unfavorable.

Where linkage is high but leverage is low (e.g., Mexico and Taiwan), external democratizing pressure will be diffuse and indirect but nevertheless considerable. Even in the absence of direct external pressure, governments face intense scrutiny from international media, transnational human-rights networks, and internationally oriented domestic constituencies. Consequently, governments will be sensitive to shifts in international opinion. Even if governments are not directly pushed to democratize, the pursuit of international legitimacy creates incentives to avoid egregious abuse and may induce them to build credible democratic institutions.

In low-linkage countries, international democratizing pressure is weaker. Where both linkage and leverage are low, as in Russia, external pressure is likely to be minimal. In such a context, even serious abuses may fail to trigger a strong international reaction; when punitive action is undertaken, it is unlikely to have a significant impact. Consequently, governments will have considerable room to maneuver in building or maintaining authoritarian regimes. In this context of relative international permissiveness, regime outcomes hinge primarily on domestic factors. Democratization in such cases thus requires a strong domestic "push."

Where linkage is low but leverage is high, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, international pressure may be significant but it tends to be limited and sporadic. Governments that fail to meet international electoral or human-rights standards may confront debilitating cuts in external assistance. However, such pressure is often limited to the holding of minimally acceptable elections, thereby leaving autocrats substantial room to maneuver. Even when autocrats fall, regimes may

not democratize. In the absence of extensive linkage, international pressure often ceases after an electoral turnover, which may allow successor governments to violate democratic norms at low external cost. Hence, although a high-leverage/low-linkage environment may raise the cost of authoritarianism, it is less propitious for democratization.

THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION: ORGANIZATIONAL POWER AND AUTHORITARIAN STABILITY

Our domestic-level analysis centers on the balance of power between autocrats and their opponents.[102] Much of the literature on democratization has focused on the opposition – or societal – side of this story. A large body of scholarship highlights the centrality of organized labor and other class actors, civil society, mass protest, and insurgency in undermining authoritarianism and/or installing democracy.[103] Other recent studies point to the importance of opposition strategy. For example, Marc Howard and Philip Roessler link the formation of broad opposition coalitions to the liberalization of competitive authoritarian regimes, whereas Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik attribute the success of "electoral revolutions" in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the 2000s to the diffusion of particular opposition techniques and tactics that were initially developed in Eastern Europe.[104]

Yet regime outcomes also hinge on incumbents' capacity to resist opposition challenges.[105] Authoritarian governments vary considerably in their ability to control civil society, co-opt or divide oppositions, repress protest, and/or steal elections. Consider the story of the three little pigs. Setting normative preferences aside, imagine that the pigs are autocratic incumbents, their houses are their regimes, and the wolf represents prodemocracy movements. The wolf huffs and puffs at all three houses, but the impact of his huffing and puffing varies across cases: Whereas the houses of straw and sticks quickly collapse, the house of bricks remains intact. The key to explaining these outcomes lies not in the wolf's abilities or strategies but in differences in the strength of the houses.

Many recent analyses of regime change – for example, the literature on the "color revolutions" of the 2000s – focus on democratic "huffing and puffing"

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[102] Here, we draw on Theda Skocpol's work (1973, 1979) on the causes of social revolution, as well as more recent regime analyses that highlight the role of state and party organization and the balance of power between state and societal actors, including Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), Slater (2003, 2010), Bellin (2004), Smith (2005), Waldner (2005), Way (2005a), and Brownlee (2007a).

[103] On organized labor and class actors, see Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), Collier (1999a), and Bellin (2000); on civil society, see Fish (1995), Diamond (1999), and Howard (2003); on protest, see Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Beissinger (2002), Thompson and Kuntz (2004, 2005), and Tucker (2007); and on insurgent democratization, see Wood (2000).

[104] Howard and Roessler (2006); Bunce and Wolchik (2006a, b).

[105] On this issue, see Skocpol (1973, 1979), Snyder (1998), Brownlee (2002), Slater (2003, 2010), Bellin (2004), and Way (2005a, 2005b).

but pay insufficient attention to the strength of authoritarian houses.[106] In some countries, bankrupt states; weak, underpaid, and disorganized security services; and fragmented elites left regimes vulnerable to collapse in the face of minimal protest. Thus, as Jeffrey Herbst observed, it was "the weakness of African states rather than the strength of democratic opposition" that drove many regime transitions in that region. African democracy movements frequently confronted states that "were rotting from within. With a mere push many would collapse."[107] Way finds a similar dynamic in the former Soviet Union.[108] For example, in Georgia, where police had not been paid in three months, Eduard Shevardnadze abandoned power in the face of "undersized" crowds, largely because he "no longer controlled the military and security forces" and was "too politically weak" to order repression.[109] Likewise, in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, the police stepped aside as a few hundred protestors seized regional governments and demonstrations of no more than 10,000 people led President Askar Akayev to abandon power.[110] Finally, in Haiti, the Aristide government was "toppled by a rag-tag army of as few as 200 rebels."[111] The rebels "did not fight a single battle. The police simply changed out of their uniforms, grabbed bottles of rum, and headed for the hills."[112]

In other cases, the story played out differently. Where state and/or governing party structures were well organized and cohesive, autocrats often thwarted serious opposition challenges. For example, the Armenian government, backed by army veterans who had recently returned from a successful war with Azerbaijan, faced down crowds of up to 200 thousand protesters following the rigged 1996 presidential election.[113] In Zimbabwe, opposition plans for "mass action" to protest the flawed 2000 elections were "deferred indefinitely" in the face of brutal police repression[114]; after the 2002 election, opposition leaders were "unwilling to consider" mass action "given the vast repressive machinery that would confront them."[115] In Malaysia, although the 1998 arrest of Anwar Ibrahim gave rise to an unprecedented *Reformasi* movement, regime opponents confronted a "highly effective and repressive police force."[116] Protest was met forcefully by riot police and ultimately "posed no threat to the government's stability."[117] Finally, in Serbia, opposition forces were mobilized throughout the 1990s, but autocratic breakdown occurred only after military defeat and a severe economic crisis had weakened the state. Opposition movements in Armenia, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia were stronger than those in Haiti, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. The fact that regime change occurred in the *latter* cases (or, in Serbia, only *after* the state was battered

[106] The recent literature on authoritarian stability has paid far greater attention to issues of incumbent strength. See Geddes (1999), Slater (2003, 2010), Bellin (2004), Smith (2005), Magaloni (2006), Brownlee (2007a), Greene (2007), Pepinsky (2009b), and Blaydes (forthcoming).

[107] Herbst (2001: 364, 361).

[108] See Way (2002a, 2005a, 2005b).

[109] Mitchell (2004: 345, 348).

[110] Radnitz (2006).

[111] *The Economist*, March 6, 2004, p. 39. See also Wucker (2004).

[112] Dudley (2004: 27).

[113] See Fuller (1996a: 45) and Stefes (2005).

[114] *Africa Today*, January 2001, p. 25; see also Raftopoulos (2001: 23).

[115] Raftopoulos (2002: 418).

[116] Slater (2003: 89).

[117] Felker (1999: 46); see also Hilley (2001: 151).

by successive military defeats) suggests that the fate of authoritarian regimes rests not only on the opposition forces but also on the robustness of the regime that they are up against.

Variation in incumbent power is particularly important in the analysis of competitive authoritarianism. The regimes analyzed in this study had not democratized by 1990 (or, in a few cases, suffered authoritarian reversals in the early 1990s) despite a highly favorable international environment. In nearly all of these cases, the domestic impetus for democratization was weak.[118] With a few exceptions (most notably Mexico and Taiwan), civil societies lacked the organization, resources, and rural presence to sustain the kind of robust democracy movements seen in countries such as Poland, South Korea, and South Africa. Given this lack of variation, opposition-centered variables are of limited utility in explaining diverging outcomes.

Our approach to incumbent power is *organizational*. As Samuel Huntington observed, organization is "the foundation of political stability."[119] Sustaining modern authoritarianism is a complex and costly endeavor. It entails dissuading diverse social and political actors from challenging the regime (through co-optation, intimidation, or repression), as well as maintaining the loyalty and cooperation of powerful actors within the regime. These challenges are especially great in competitive authoritarian regimes because incumbents must deal with myriad actors (parties, media, judges, NGOs) and arenas of contestation (elections, legislatures, and courts) that do not exist – or are merely a façade – in fully closed regimes. In all but the most traditional societies, these tasks require organized mechanisms of coordination, monitoring, and enforcement.[120]

Building in part on Lucan Way's work on failed authoritarianism and pluralism by default in the former Soviet Union,[121] we focus on two organizations: states and parties. Effective state and party organizations enhance incumbents' capacity to prevent elite defection, co-opt or repress opponents, defuse or crack down on protest, and win (or steal) elections. Where states and governing parties are strong, autocrats are often able to survive despite vigorous opposition challenges. Where they are weak, incumbents may fall in the face of relatively weak opposition movements.

State Coercive Capacity

The role of state coercive capacity has received relatively little attention in recent regime studies.[122] Recent analyses highlight the importance of state strength to democracy. Scholars such as Guillermo O'Donnell and Stephen Holmes argue that an effective state, grounded in the rule of law, is essential to protecting basic

[118] Howard (2003).
[119] Huntington (1968: 461).
[120] See Selznick (1960), Slater (2003, 2010), Smith (2005), and Brownlee (2007a).
[121] Way (2005a).
[122] Exceptions include Thompson (2001), Way (2002a, 2005a, 2005b), Slater (2003, forthcoming), Bellin (2004), and Darden (2008).

liberal-democratic rights.[123] As an earlier generation of scholarship made clear, however, strong states also enhance autocratic stability.[124] Whereas some state institutions check executive power and uphold a democratic rule of law, others provide mechanisms to suppress opposition and maintain political hegemony. *Authoritarian* state institutions – from security forces to local prefects to intelligence agencies – furnish governments with tools to monitor, co-opt, intimidate, and repress potential opponents, both within and outside the regime.[125] Although these state institutions often perform illiberal and even illegal functions, they nevertheless may be effective.[126] And the more effective they are, the more stable authoritarian regimes will be. State-building is thus as important to authoritarianism as it is to democracy.[127] Where post–Cold War autocrats inherited weak states and failed to rebuild them (e.g., Albania, Georgia, Haiti, and Madagascar), they rarely endured in power. Where authoritarians invested seriously in state-building – as in Zimbabwe during the 1980s, Cambodia and Armenia during the 1990s, and Russia under Putin – the result was not democracy but rather more robust authoritarianism.

State coercive capacity is critical to regime outcomes. The centrality of state coercive structures was highlighted in Theda Skocpol's seminal study of social revolution.[128] Only where states' coercive apparatus was weakened (often by war), Skocpol found, did autocracies fall prey to revolution. More recently, Eva Bellin has highlighted the role of strong security apparatuses in sustaining authoritarianism in the Middle East. As Bellin argued, "democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the state's coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it."[129] Likewise, Way has shown how limited coercive capacity undermined autocratic consolidation in the former Soviet Union.[130]

Coercive capacity is central to competitive authoritarian stability. The greater a government's capacity to either prevent or crack down on opposition protest, the greater are its prospects for survival. Incumbents may employ distinct forms of coercion. Some, which we label *high-intensity coercion*, are high-visibility acts that target large numbers of people, well-known individuals, or major institutions. An example is the violent repression – often involving security forces firing on crowds – of mass demonstrations, as occurred in Mexico City in 1968 and Tiananmen Square in China in 1989. Although such massacres are uncommon in competitive authoritarian regimes, violent repression of protest – in each case, with dozens of reported deaths – occurred in Cambodia, Kenya, and Madagascar. Other forms of high-intensity coercion include campaigns of violence against

[123] See O'Donnell (1993, 1999) and Holmes (1997, 2002). See also Linz and Stepan (1996), Mengisteab and Daddieh (1999), Sperling (2000), Carothers (2002: 16), Bunce (2003: 180–1), Joseph (2003), Bratton (2005), and Bratton and Chang (2005).

[124] See especially Huntington (1968) and Skocpol (1973, 1979).

[125] Slater (2003, 2010).

[126] See Darden (2008).

[127] See Way (2002a, 2005a).

[128] Skocpol (1979).

[129] Bellin (2004: 143).

[130] Way (2002a, 2005a). See also Slater (2010).

opposition parties (e.g., Cambodia and Zimbabwe), imprisonment (e.g., Malaysia and Russia), attempted assassination of major opposition leaders (e.g., Belarus and Ukraine), and high-profile assaults on democratic institutions such as parliament (e.g., Russia in 1993).

Competitive authoritarian regimes also rely on other, less visible, forms of coercion, which we label *low-intensity coercion*. Because these coercive acts do not involve high-profile targets and thus rarely make headlines or trigger international condemnation, they are often critical to sustaining competitive authoritarian rule. Low-intensity coercion takes myriad forms. One of them is surveillance. Governments in Belarus, Nicaragua, Russia, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe used vast surveillance apparatuses and informant networks to monitor opposition activity throughout the country.[131] Another type of low-intensity coercion is low-profile physical harassment, or localized attacks on opposition activists and supporters. This includes the use of security forces or paramilitary thugs to break up opposition meetings; vandalize opposition or independent media offices; and harass, detain, and occasionally murder journalists and opposition activists. Low-intensity coercion also may take nonphysical forms, including denial of employment, scholarships, or university entrance to opposition activists; denial of public services – such as heat and electricity – to individuals and communities with ties to the opposition; and use of tax, regulatory, or other state agencies to investigate and prosecute opposition politicians, entrepreneurs, and media owners.[132]

Whereas high-intensity coercion is often a response to an imminent – and highly threatening – opposition challenge, low-intensity coercion is often aimed at preventing such challenges from emerging in the first place. Where it is effective (e.g., Singapore and Belarus in the 2000s), many opposition supporters conclude that antigovernment activity is simply not worth the risk, leaving only the most die-hard activists to oppose the regime.[133] By deterring opposition protest (or nipping it in the bud), successful low-intensity coercion thus reduces the need for high-intensity coercion. Where opposition movements are so thoroughly beaten down that they pose no serious challenge, incumbents have little need to steal elections or order police to fire on crowds.

Coercive capacity may be measured along two dimensions: *scope* and *cohesion*.[134] Scope refers to the effective reach of the state's coercive apparatus, or what Michael Mann calls infrastructural power.[135] Specifically, we focus on the size and quality of the "internal security sector," or the "cluster of organizations with direct responsibility for internal security and domestic order."[136] This includes

[131] In some cases (e.g., Peru and Ukraine), surveillance targeted agents within the regime itself, allowing executives to use blackmail as a means of maintaining discipline within the government and security forces (Cameron 2006; Darden 2008).

[132] Such measures have been employed in Belarus and Ukraine. On Ukraine, see Allina-Pisano (2005).

[133] For an excellent analysis of these dynamics in Mexico, see Greene (2007).

[134] These dimensions are operationalized in Appendix IV.

[135] Mann (1984).

[136] Weitzer (1990: 3). See also Williams (2001a).

army and police forces, presidential guards, gendarmes and riot police, secret police and other specialized internal security units, and the domestic intelligence apparatus,[137] as well as paramilitary organizations such as death squads, militias, and armed "youth wings."[138] It also may include a variety of other state agents – local prefects, tax officials, and state enterprise directors – who are mobilized to harass the opposition. Where scope is high, as in Belarus, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Russia, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe, the state possesses a large and effective internal security sector – usually equipped with extensive intelligence networks and specialized police and paramilitary units – which is capable of engaging society across the national territory. Security forces are well funded and well equipped, and they have a demonstrated capacity to penetrate society, monitor opposition activity, and put down protest in all parts of the country.

Where scope is low, as in Albania, Georgia, Haiti, and Macedonia, armed forces are small, poorly equipped, and often lacking in specialized internal security agencies. Security forces do not effectively penetrate the national territory; law-enforcement agents are nonexistent – or maintain only a token presence – in much of the country; or, alternatively, are underpaid to the extent that they are largely ineffective and refuse to obey orders. Such cases frequently are characterized by extensive "brown areas,"[139] or territories that lack even a minimal state presence. For example, in Georgia in the early 1990s, the military consisted mainly of "weekend fighters and volunteers" who had to feed and arm themselves.[140] Similarly, Haiti possessed no standing army after 1994, and its police force was one of the smallest, per capita, in the world.[141] The Haitian police "often lack[ed] the means to conduct basic operations" and were not present in many rural areas.[142]

Scope is particularly important for low-intensity coercion. Systematic surveillance, harassment, and intimidation require an infrastructure capable of directing, coordinating, and supplying agents across the national territory. Where such an infrastructure is absent or ineffective, incumbents' ability to monitor and check grassroots opposition activity is limited.[143] This (often de facto) space for mobilization makes it easier for opposition groups to organize electoral campaigns or protest movements. Indeed, the (attempted) use of high-intensity coercion is often evidence that mechanisms of low-intensity coercion are weak or have broken down.

Cohesion refers to the level of compliance *within* the state apparatus. For coercion to be effective, subordinates within the state must reliably follow their superiors' commands. Where cohesion is high, incumbents can be confident that even highly controversial or illegal orders (such as firing on crowds of protesters, killing

[137] Weitzer (1990: 3).
[138] See Roessler (2005).
[139] O'Donnell (1993).
[140] Zürcher (2007: 137–9).
[141] Erikson and Minson (2005a: 4).
[142] Schulz (1997–1998: 85).
[143] An extreme example is Haiti, where security forces failed to prevent the emergence and spread of armed gangs – in urban slums, rural towns, and – crucially – along the Dominican border – that eventually overthrew the Aristide government (Fatton 2002: 151–2; Erikson 2004).

opposition leaders, and stealing elections) will be carried out by both high-level security officials and rank-and-file soldiers and bureaucrats. Where cohesion is low, leaders cannot be confident that such orders will be complied with, by either high-level security officials or the rank and file. Noncompliance takes a variety of forms; in extreme cases, security officials may openly disobey presidential orders and even cooperate with (or defect to) the opposition (e.g., Georgia in 2003, Madagascar in 2002, and Ukraine in 2004) and rank-and-file soldiers may desert en masse (e.g., Haiti in 2004).[144]

Cohesion is critical to the success of high-intensity coercion. Acts of high-intensity coercion are risky ventures. Because they are likely to trigger strong negative reactions both at home and abroad, such acts often exacerbate regime crises and may even contribute to regime collapse.[145] State officials responsible for ordering or carrying out the repression thus run considerable risks because if it fails and the regime collapses, they will be vulnerable to retribution. Hence, acts of high-intensity coercion pose a particular threat to the chain of command, increasing the likelihood of internal disobedience. A breakdown in coercive command structures undermined incumbents' capacity to engage in high-intensity coercion in Benin (1990), Georgia (1991 and 2003), Russia (1993), Ukraine (1994 and 2004), and Madagascar (2002). Only where the state apparatus is cohesive (e.g., Armenia, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe) can incumbents confidently order acts of large-scale repression or abuse.

State cohesion is rooted in several factors. One factor is fiscal health.[146] Unpaid state officials are less likely to follow orders – especially high-risk orders such as repression and vote-stealing. Thus, in much of Africa and the former Soviet Union, deep fiscal crises eroded discipline within states during the immediate post–Cold War period. In extreme cases, such as Benin, Georgia, and Malawi, the noncompliance of unpaid security forces left incumbents' without means to crack down on opposition protest. However, material resources are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure cohesion. In Armenia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, state apparatuses remained intact despite severe fiscal constraints. Indeed, incumbents who rely strictly on material payoffs are often vulnerable to insubordination during such crises.

The highest levels of cohesion are usually found where there exists one of three alternative sources of cohesion. The first is shared ethnic identity in a context of a highly salient ethnic cleavage. In a deeply divided society (e.g., Guyana and Malaysia), autocrats may enhance loyalty within security agencies by packing them with ethnic allies.[147] Second, cohesion may be enhanced where state

[144] Subtler forms of noncompliance include calling in sick when coercive action is expected, promising compliance but failing to carry it out, and carrying out orders in ritualistic – and thus ineffective – ways. See, for example, Bujosevic and Radovanovic's (2003: 19–20) description of police response to protests in Serbia in 2000.

[145] Examples include the assassinations of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in Nicaragua (1972) and Benigno Aquino in the Philippines (1983).

[146] See Decalo (1998) and Gros (1998a: 9–10).

[147] See Enloe (1976, 1980) and Decalo (1998: 19–21). Thus, cohesion is enhanced when governing parties and militaries are "bound together in a joint communal mission" (Enloe 1980: 179).

elites are bound by a salient (often nationalist or revolutionary) ideology, as in Croatia, Nicaragua, and Serbia.[148] Third, cohesion may be rooted in solidarity ties forged in a context of violent struggle, such as war, revolution, or liberation movements.[149] Where top state positions are controlled by a generation of elites that won a war (Armenia) or led a successful insurgency (Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe), state actors are more likely to possess the cohesion, self-confidence, and "stomach" to use force.[150]

Measuring cohesion is problematic. It is often unclear how cohesive an organization is until it is seriously tested. However, using state responses to regime crises during the period under study as an indicator of cohesion would be tautological. To avoid this problem, we rely on two types of indicator.[151] First, wherever possible, we examine levels of cohesion in periods *prior to* the period under study. For example, coercive apparatuses in Mozambique and Nicaragua remained cohesive despite serious external challenges during the 1980s, whereas those in Benin and Haiti showed evidence of repeated indiscipline during the 1980s.[152] Second, we look for evidence of non-material sources of cohesion: ethnic or ideological ties (in a context of deep ethnic or ideological polarization) or a history of shared struggle. Where we find evidence of either prior discipline under stress or nonmaterial bases of cohesion, we score cohesion as high. Where we find evidence of prior indiscipline, we score cohesion as low. All other cases are scored as medium.

Party Strength

Like states, strong parties are important pillars of authoritarian rule.[153] As scholars such as Barbara Geddes, Jason Brownlee, and Beatriz Magaloni argue, governing parties help manage elite conflict, often through the organization and distribution of patronage.[154] By providing institutional mechanisms for rulers to reward loyalists and by lengthening actors' time horizons through the provision of future opportunities for career advancement, parties encourage elite cooperation over defection.[155] As long as the party is expected to remain in power, losers

[148] Both Selznick (1960) and Skocpol (1979: 169) and argue that ideology plays an important role in sustaining the cohesion of revolutionary leaderships.

[149] Studies of the origins of states and parties have long emphasized the role of conflict in generating strong and cohesive organizations (Huntington 1970; Tilly 1975, 1992; Shefter 1994; Hale 2005a, 2006).

[150] Along similar lines, Mark Thompson (2001) and Andrew Nathan (2001) argue that the survival of the revolutionary generation in the Chinese Communist Party was critical to its decision to crack down on protestors in 1989.

[151] For full operationalization, see Appendix IV.

[152] Such an assessment is more difficult in post-communist (and particularly post-Soviet) cases, where the extent of state transformation in 1989–1991 makes it meaningless to use capacity in the 1980s as a measure for capacity in the 1990s. In these cases, we look for evidence of patterns of discipline or indiscipline in areas of state activity unrelated to regime outcomes (i.e., tax collection, the draft) in the post-communist period.

[153] See Zolberg (1966), Huntington (1968), Huntington and Moore (1970), Geddes (1999), Smith (2005), Way (2005a), and Brownlee (2007a).

[154] Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2007a); Magaloni (2008).

[155] Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2007a).

in short-term power or policy struggles are likely to remain loyal in the expectation of access to spoils in future rounds.[156] Where governing parties are weak or absent, regime elites see fewer opportunities for political advancement from within and are thus more likely to seek power from outside the regime.[157] Such elite defection is often a major cause of authoritarian breakdown.[158]

Yet parties do more than manage intra-elite conflict. For example, they often help to maintain authoritarian stability "on the ground." Grassroots party structures often play a major role in mobilizing support for autocrats. Thus, the KMT's mass organization "transformed millions of Taiwanese into members and supporters,"[159] which provided the regime with "overpowering" mobilizational capacity.[160] The Serbian League of Communists helped mobilize as many as five million supporters in the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" that allowed Milošević to overcome local opposition and consolidate power.[161] Party organization also may enhance coercive capacity. Autocratic governments may use local party cells, youth wings, and other grassroots structures to monitor and suppress opposition, transforming them into an "extension of the state's police power."[162] In Kenya, for example, KANU served as an "adjunct to the security forces in monitoring and controlling opposition," deploying its youth wing to "patrol the country, instill support for the party, and monitor dissent."[163] In Taiwan, the KMT's extensive network of informers was deployed to "keep watch over neighborhoods, factories, military units, businesses, and government offices."[164]

Mass organization also helps deter defection by ensuring that defectors will fail.[165] Where parties are well organized at the grassroots level, defectors often have difficulty mobilizing support. Lacking cadres on the ground, even high-profile defectors (such as Tengku Razaleigh in Malaysia, Edger Tekere and Simba Makoni in Zimbabwe, and Augustine Mrema in Tanzania) could not compete in the trenches and performed poorly in elections. Thus, strong parties not only make elite defection less likely, as Geddes and others argue, but they also ensure that defectors are less likely to succeed.[166]

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[156] Geddes (1999: 129, 131).

[157] Way (2002a); Brownlee (2007a).

[158] This argument is made by Easter (1997), Geddes (1999), and Brownlee (2007a) and is line with earlier work by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986).

[159] Rigger (2000: 137).

[160] Cheng (1989: 482).

[161] Thomas (1999: 44–51). Similarly, the Mexican PRI's "gigantic human network of clientelist relations" (Pacheco Mendez 1991: 255) was critical in "organizing, supporting, and controlling popular demands" (Centeno 1994: 53).

[162] Widner (1992a: 8).

[163] Widner (1992a: 7, 132).

[164] Hood (1997: 59). See also Gold (1997: 170). Grassroots party structures were also used for surveillance and intimidation in Cambodia, Guyana, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Serbia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

[165] Even the strongest governing parties occasionally suffer high-level defections. Examples include Mexico in 1940, 1946, 1952, and 1987; Malaysia in 1986 and 1998; Zimbabwe in 1988 and 2008; Taiwan in 1993; and Tanzania in 1995.

[166] The current literature on parties and authoritarian durability (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2007a; Magaloni 2008) focuses on party mechanisms to prevent elite defection but says little about why defectors succeed or fail after moving into opposition.

Strong parties are particularly important in competitive authoritarian regimes because unlike other authoritarian regimes, incumbents must retain and exercise power through democratic institutions. Most important, strong parties help win elections. Elections in competitive authoritarian regimes are often hard-fought contests. Winning them usually entails some mix of voter mobilization and fraud, both of which require organization. Mass parties provide an infrastructure for electoral mobilization. In Tanzania, for example, the massive Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) network of 10 House Party Cells made it "very easy for the party to reach everyone in the country."[167] Likewise, the Mexican PRI's vast organization allowed it to become "one of the world's most accomplished vote-getting machines."[168] Parties also help *steal* votes. Ballot-box stuffing and other forms of fraud require coordination, discretion, and discipline among numerous lower-level authorities – which party organizations provide.[169] For example, the PRI organization facilitated various ballot-box–stuffing strategies, including "flying brigades," in which voters were trucked from precinct to precinct so they could cast multiple ballots.[170]

Parties also help control legislatures. Legislative control is critical in competitive authoritarian regimes.[171] For one, it enhances the executive's capacity to manipulate and control other areas of politics. Because top judicial and electoral authorities often are chosen directly by legislatures or require legislative approval, executive control over constitutional courts, electoral commissions, and other agents of horizontal accountability often requires a reliable legislative majority. Control over the legislature also may allow the governing party to modify the constitution (for example, eliminating presidential term limits) to extend or deepen authoritarian rule.[172] Finally, legislative control has a defensive purpose: to eliminate the legislature as a potential arena for contestation. When not controlled by the executive, legislatures may thwart presidential appointments, create new mechanisms of oversight, conduct high-profile investigations into government abuse, and even threaten the incumbent's political survival by voting to remove him or her (as in Madagascar in 1996 and as nearly occurred in Russia in 1993 and 1999).

Strong parties facilitate legislative control in two ways. First, they are more likely to win legislative elections. Presidents without such parties (e.g., Soglo in Benin, Fujimori in Peru, and Yeltsin in Russia) have weaker coattails: They often fail to translate their own electoral success into legislative majorities. Second, well-organized, cohesive parties help maintain legislative control between elections, for they offer incumbents a variety of means to keep legislative allies in line (mechanisms of patronage distribution, a well-known party label, ideological

[167] Lucan Way, interview with Joseph Warioba, Prime Minister of Tanzania 1985–1990, Dar es Salaam, November 22, 2007.

[168] Cornelius (1996: 57).

[169] For example, the Mexican PRI carried out fraud in a highly disciplined manner. Instructions issued by the Interior Ministry were passed on to governors and then carried out by local party officials (Carbonell 2002: 85).

[170] Cornelius (1996: 60).

[171] On the role of legislatures in nondemocratic regimes, see Gandhi and Przeworski (2007).

[172] See Magaloni (2006).

or other sources of cohesion). Where governments lack such a party, legislative factions are more prone to internal rebellion and schism.[173] Such crises create opportunities for opposition forces to gain control of the legislature, which can result in parliamentary efforts to remove the president from power.[174]

Finally, strong parties facilitate executive succession. As discussed in Chapter 1, succession poses a difficult challenge for most autocracies. Because they must worry about prosecution after leaving office,[175] incumbents generally place a high value on finding a successor who will ensure their protection. This requires not only winning the election but also doing so with a candidate who can be trusted or controlled. Strong parties facilitate succession in several ways: They have a larger pool from which to draw strong candidates, they offer mechanisms to prevent the defection of losing aspirants, and they possess electoral capacity that is independent of the outgoing executive. Thus, it is not surprising that smooth successions almost always occur in competitive authoritarian regimes with strong governing parties (e.g., Malaysia, Mozambique, and Tanzania). Where party structures are undeveloped, succession is more traumatic: Candidate pools are smaller, the likelihood of internal conflict and defection is greater, and the party's electoral viability is less certain.

Like state strength, party strength may be measured in terms of scope and cohesion.[176] *Scope* refers to the size of a party's infrastructure, or the degree to which it penetrates the national territory and society. Where scope is high, as in Taiwan, Malaysia, Nicaragua, and Tanzania, parties possess mass organizations, usually with large memberships and activist bases. These organizations maintain a permanent and active presence across the national territory – down to the village and/or neighborhood level – and, in some cases, they penetrate the workplace and much of civil society as well. For example, UMNO's 16,500 branch organizations allowed it to penetrate "every village in the country" and assign a party agent to monitor every 10 households.[177] Similarly, the CCM's 2-million–member mass organization enabled it to operate a "10-house" cell structure in villages throughout the country.[178] Where scope is low, governing parties either do not exist at all, as in Ukraine under Kravchuk, or lack even minimal organization, memberships, or activist bases, as in Benin and Peru. Thus, party operations are confined to major urban centers, the president's home region, and – in some cases – the presidential palace.[179]

[173] See Way (2005a: 200–204).

[174] Examples include Russia in 1993 and Belarus and Madagascar in 1996.

[175] See Shlapentokh (2006).

[176] For operationalization, see Appendix IV.

[177] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 24, 1999, p. 1; Case (2001a: 52, 2001b: 37).

[178] Berg-Schlosser and Siegler (1990: 81); Barkan (1994: 16). Where scope is medium (e.g., KANU in Kenya and UNIP in Zambia), parties possess national structures, with offices in most of the country, but they are not mass organizations that penetrate or mobilize society in any significant way.

[179] In Peru, for example, Alberto Fujimori's New Majority "had scarcely any organizational presence outside the national congress" (Roberts 2002: 18). After Fujimori's 1995 reelection, "there wasn't even . . . a party headquarters where the president could celebrate his victory" (Degregori 2000: 62).

Cohesion refers to incumbents' ability to secure the cooperation of partisan allies within the government, in the legislature, and at the local or regional level. Cohesion is crucial to preventing elite defection, particularly during periods of crisis, when the incumbent's grip on power is threatened. Where cohesion is high (e.g., Malaysia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Zimbabwe), allied ministers, legislators, and governors routinely support the government, implement presidential directives, and vote the party line. Internal rebellion or defection is rare, even in the face of major crises or opposition challenges; when defections occur, they tend not to attract many followers. For example, the Sandinistas did not experience a single public schism during the 1980s in the midst of civil war and severe economic crisis.[180] Where cohesion is low, as in Benin, Georgia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Russia under Yeltsin, parties are little more than loose coalitions of relatively autonomous actors, many of which derive their power and status from outside the party. Incumbents routinely confront insubordination, rebellion, or defection within the cabinet, in the legislative bloc, and among regional bosses. Consequently, regimes are vulnerable to internal crises triggered by splits within the governing coalition, which result in opposition takeovers of the legislature or strong electoral challenges from erstwhile regime insiders. Indeed, in several cases (Georgia in 2001–2003 and Mali in 2000–2002), internal crises emerged even in the absence of economic problems or a major opposition challenge.

Sources of party cohesion vary. Although much of the literature on parties and authoritarian stability focuses on mechanisms of patronage distribution,[181] patronage is a relatively weak source of cohesion. Patronage may help hold elites together during normal times, but parties that are based exclusively on patronage ties often become vulnerable during periods of crisis. When economic crisis threatens incumbents' capacity to distribute patronage, or when incumbents appear vulnerable to defeat, patronage-based parties often suffer large-scale defection (e.g., Zambia in 1990–1991, Senegal in 2000, Kenya in 2002, and Georgia in 2001–2003). In such cases, elite access to patronage often has been much better secured by going over to the opposition than by remaining loyal to the ruling party. As one defecting member of the ruling UNIP in Zambia explained in 1991, "only a stupid fly . . . follows a dead body to the grave."[182]

Cohesion tends to be greater when it is rooted in nonmaterial ties such as shared ethnicity (e.g., Guyana and Malaysia) or ideology (e.g., Nicaragua) in a context of deep ethnic or ideological cleavage. Bonds of solidarity forged out of periods of violent struggle are perhaps the most robust source of cohesion. Parties that emerge from successful revolutionary or liberation movements (e.g., Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe) tend to be highly cohesive – at least while the founding generation survives.

Again, efforts to measure cohesion must be careful to avoid tautology. Therefore, we do not use levels of internal discipline during the period of study as

[180] Similarly, ZANU in Zimbabwe experienced strikingly few defections during the 2000–2008 crisis.

[181] Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2007a).

[182] Quoted in Ihonvbere (1996: 70).

evidence of cohesion. Instead, we operationalize party cohesion in the following way[183]: Cases in which presidents rule without a party (e.g., Belarus), are backed by multiple and competing parties (e.g., Russia under Yeltsin), or govern with newly formed parties that are organized around patronage (e.g., Benin, Georgia, Mali, and Peru) are scored as low cohesion. Established parties in which patronage systems are institutionalized but are the only real source of cohesion (e.g., Kenya and Zambia) are scored as medium. Two types of party are scored as high cohesion: (1) parties that exhibit strong ideological (e.g., Serbia) or ethnic (e.g., Guyana and Malaysia) ties where that cleavage is highly salient; and (2) parties whose origins lie in revolutionary or liberation movements and which are still led by the founding generation (e.g., Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe).

State Economic Control as a Substitute for Coercive and Party Organization

Discretionary state control over the economy also may enhance incumbents' capacity to preempt or thwart opposition challenges.[184] Where such control is extensive, it may substitute effectively for powerful coercive and party organizations. Incumbents' economic power may be considered high where resources are concentrated in state hands and governments enjoy substantial discretionary power in allocating those resources. Economic resources are concentrated where the state maintains control over key means of production and finance, as in many partially reformed command economies,[185] or where a large percentage of national income takes the form of rents controlled by the state, as in many mineral-based rentier states.[186] Rulers exert discretionary control where they can routinely use the tax system, credit, licensing, concessions and government contracts, and other economic policy levers to punish opponents and reward allies.[187]

Discretionary economic power furnishes incumbents with powerful tools to compel compliance and punish opposition. Where the livelihoods, careers, and business prospects of much of the population can be affected easily and decisively by government decisions, opposition activity becomes a high-risk venture. Businesses linked to the opposition may be denied access to government credit, licenses, contracts, or even property rights; independent media may be deprived of access to newsprint or advertising; public employees may be forced to work for the governing party; and critics may be fired, blacklisted, or denied access

[183] For a full operationalization, see Appendix IV.

[184] Dahl (1971: 48–61); Fish (2005); McMann (2006); Greene (2007).

[185] Fish (2005).

[186] Our view of the causal link between oil and autocracy differs somewhat from many standard approaches (cf. Ross 2001). In our view, reliance on oil promotes autocracy not only because it limits the need for taxation or provides resources for patronage and security, but also because it allows autocrats to monopolize control over a large share of societal wealth. In this sense, oil facilitates autocratic rule in the same way that extensive state control of the economy does.

[187] In the absence of substantial discretionary power, even extensive state intervention may be compatible with democracy (e.g., Sweden).

to essential goods and services. Discretionary state economic power also may be used to starve oppositions of resources.[188] For political oppositions to be viable, they must have access to resources. Unless those resources are distributed equitably by the state, they must come from the private sector and civil society. Where states control most means of production or monopolize the main sources of wealth, private sectors will be small and civil societies will be poor, leaving "no conceivable financial base for opposition."[189] Where vast discretionary power allows governments to punish businesses for their political behavior, opposition parties, independent media, and other civic groups will have few reliable channels of finance.[190]

In some cases, then, discretionary economic power may partly substitute for strong party and state organizations in limiting elite defection and thwarting opposition challenges. Where state economic power is extensive, as in Belarus, Botswana, and Gabon, it may be so costly for elites to defect and so difficult for opposition forces to mobilize resources that incumbents go largely unchallenged, even in the absence of strong state or party organizations.

Combining State and Party Strength

Strong states and parties contribute to authoritarian stability in different ways. State coercive and economic power enhances incumbents' capacity to suppress opponents and critics and to defuse or preempt potential opposition movements through intimidation, co-optation, and deprivation of resources. Strong parties help incumbents manage intra-elite conflict, mobilize support, and win or steal elections.

State and party functions often overlap and, to an extent, they are substitutable. For example, strong parties may be so successful at mobilizing support and maintaining elite cohesion that incumbents can survive even in the absence of strong states (e.g., Mozambique and Tanzania). In addition, strong parties facilitate incumbent control over a wide range of state institutions through the provision of loyal cadres bound by a partisan identity. Finally, well-organized parties may perform state-like coercive functions, including surveillance and other forms of low-intensity coercion.

Strong states also may partially substitute for weak parties. State agencies may be deployed as what Henry Hale calls "party substitutes."[191] In Peru and Ukraine, state intelligence agencies played a central role in maintaining elite cohesion through surveillance, blackmail, and bribery.[192] In other cases, incumbents used state agencies as party-like mobilizational tools. In Ukraine, governments mobilized public teachers and doctors for electoral campaigns; in Peru

[188] Greene (2007) and Levitsky and Way (2010).

[189] Riker (1982: 7). See also Dahl (1971: 48–61) and Fish (2005: 156–7).

[190] By contrast, where economic liberalization shifts resources into the private sphere and strips governments of tools of economic coercion, as in much of Eastern Europe and the Americas during the 1990s, entrepreneurs often play a major role in financing opposition.

[191] Hale (2006).

[192] Cameron (2006); Darden (2008).

and Serbia, army, police, and other security branches were used for campaign activities.[193]

There are limits to substitutability, however. In Peru and Ukraine, succession crises and legislative weakness – both exacerbated by party weakness – contributed to crises that ultimately toppled regimes.[194] Moreover, elite conflict rooted in party weakness may undermine incumbent control over coercive and other state agencies. When the governing elite is divided, security forces may be paralyzed by conflicting orders, and state officials may resist carrying out risky coercive action on behalf of any side. Incumbents may lose control over entire security agencies – or be sufficiently uncertain about their loyalty that they cannot order repression.[195]

Organizational power is thus highest where both states and parties are strong. These are clear cases of "brick houses": Strong state and party organizations give incumbent governments the capacity to hold together, even under serious crisis, and to thwart even relatively strong opposition movements – both at the ballot box and in the streets. Malaysia, Nicaragua, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe fall into this category. Organizational power is lowest where both state and party organizations are weak. These are unambiguous cases of "straw houses": Incumbents lack substantial capacity to win (or steal) elections or to crack down on protest. Moreover, they routinely suffer intra-elite conflict and defection. As a result, governments are vulnerable to collapse in the face of even modest opposition challenges; examples include Benin, Georgia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, and Ukraine under Kravchuk.

Other cases exhibit mixes of state and party strength. A few cases, including Mozambique and Tanzania, are characterized by strong governing parties but relatively weak states. In these cases, incumbents' capacity to win elections and limit intra-elite conflict may be sufficient to ensure regime stability. However, regimes remain vulnerable to opposition mobilization. In other cases, including Armenia, Belarus, and Putin's Russia, incumbents possessed relatively high state capacity but lacked cohesive parties. Although such regimes may be less vulnerable to mass protest, they are more vulnerable to internal conflict than those with strong governing parties.

The Impact of Opposition Strength

Incumbent organizational power, of course, is only one side of the story. Opposition strength is also important in explaining regime trajectories. The strength, cohesion, and strategies of opposition forces are widely viewed as critical to

[193] On Ukraine, see Allina-Pisano (2005) and Way (2005b); on Peru, see Planas (2000: 357–8); on Serbia, see LeBor (2004: 200–201).

[194] Although such crises did not occur in Belarus and Russia through 2009,the absence of a cohesive party – and the potential for elite defection – remained a point of vulnerability.

[195] See Way (2005a: 238). This was particularly evident in Ukraine in 2004, when important elements of a well-paid and well-trained security force defected to the opposition amid a regime crisis (Way 2005b).

democratization.[196] Strong civic and opposition movements shift the balance of power and resources away from state elites, which raises the cost of sustaining authoritarianism. Where opposition forces mobilize large numbers of people for elections or protest movements, incumbents must employ more nakedly autocratic means to retain power (e.g., steal elections or crack down violently on street protest), which then erode public support, generate tension within the regime elite, and risk international punitive action. Thus, the greater the opposition's mobilizational and electoral capacity, the higher is the probability that incumbents will opt for toleration over repression.[197]

Opposition strength is clearly important in explaining regime outcomes. During the Third Wave, opposition mobilization played a central role in democratization in Argentina, the Philippines, Poland, Spain, South Africa, South Korea, and elsewhere. Among our cases, opposition strength was critical to democratization in Mexico, Taiwan, and – to some extent – Ghana and Serbia. In these countries, political and civic organizations developed a capacity to mobilize citizens across territory and over time. This gave opposition forces the ability to launch sustained protest, compete effectively in elections, and monitor electoral processes, which increased the cost of repression and fraud. In other cases (e.g., Benin in 1988–1990, Zambia in 1990–1991, Madagascar in 2001–2002, and Ukraine in 2004), large-scale protest – even in the absence of a highly developed civil society – was critical to the removal of autocratic governments (even if its longer-term democratizing impact was open to question).

In general, however, the weakness of opposition forces limited their impact on competitive authoritarian regime outcomes. Because they were poor and predominantly rural societies with small middle classes (e.g., Cambodia, Haiti, and much of sub-Saharan Africa), or because they had recently emerged from decades of Leninism and state socialism (e.g., Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union), most of the cases examined in this study lacked the raw materials for a strong opposition movement. Private sectors were weak, civil society was small and narrowly based, and political parties lacked organization and any significant presence in the countryside.[198] In none of these cases did opposition forces possess the infrastructure or resources to challenge incumbent power over the long term.

Even where mass protest played an important role in dislodging autocrats from power, transitions were often facilitated by incumbent weakness. In many seemingly protest-driven transitions, incumbents' inability to prevent large-scale elite defection (Ukraine, and Zambia) or use coercion to crack down on opposition protest (Benin, Georgia, Madagascar, and Malawi) contributed directly to their fall from power. In effect, protesters knocked down a rotten door. By contrast, where coercive and/or governing party structures were strong (e.g., Armenia,

[196] See Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Collier (1999a), Diamond (1999), Wood (2000), Thompson (2001), Howard (2003), and Howard and Roessler (2006).

[197] Dahl (1971).

[198] On the weakness of civic and opposition forces in post-communist countries, see Howard (2003).

Malaysia, and Zimbabwe), incumbents often withstood even strong and sustained opposition challenges.

Indeed, in some cases, opposition strength is endogenous to incumbent capacity. For example, where incumbents possess powerful instruments of physical and/or economic coercion, they may use them to systematically undermine opposition organization. Thus, systematic coercion may weaken opposition movements by making civic political participation so risky that all but the most diehard activists exit the public sphere. Repression weakened opposition forces in Armenia, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe; in Belarus and in Putin's Russia, effective low-intensity coercion deterred strong opposition movements from emerging in the first place. Discretionary economic power also may be used to weaken or deter opposition movements. In Belarus, Gabon, and Russia in the 2000s, economic coercion and co-optation helped starve opposition movements nearly out of existence.

At the same time, incumbents' organizational weakness may enhance opposition strength. In Georgia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Ukraine, and Zambia, much of the financial and organizational muscle behind successful oppositions came from political, economic, and military actors who had recently defected from the governing coalition. In Ukraine, key financial and organizational resources behind the Orange Revolution were provided by business oligarchs who had only recently abandoned the government.[199] Likewise, in Kenya, the defection of Raila Odinga and other KANU barons just prior to the 2002 election was critical to the ruling party's defeat.[200] In these cases, it was ultimately incumbent weakness rather than opposition strength per se that drove transitions.

SYNTHESIS OF THE ARGUMENT

Our theory synthesizes the international and domestic arguments presented above. We make a three-step argument. First, where linkage is high, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, democratization is likely. Due to extensive penetration by international media, transnational human-rights networks, and multilateral organizations, even minor abuses reverberate in the West and are likely to trigger responses from Western powers. Because many domestic actors maintain ties to the West, the threat of isolation (or even a tarnished international image) is likely to trigger strong opposition at home. The cost of abuse increases the likelihood that incumbents will tolerate rather than repress opposition challenges, and that they will cede power when they are defeated. Because opposition forces maintain close ties to the West (and often view Western support as critical to their success) and because they face the same external constraints that had toppled their predecessors, new governments should rule democratically. Linkage should have a democratizing effect *even where organizational power is high*. High linkage creates incentives for incumbents to underutilize coercive capacity and tolerate opposition challenges that they could otherwise suppress – effectively wiping out the effect of domestic power balances.

[199] Way (2005b).

[200] Ndegwa (2003: 150).

High linkage also should lead to democratization where leverage is low (e.g., Mexico and Taiwan), although the process may require a stronger domestic push. In such cases, governments face less direct external pressure to democratize. Nevertheless, linkage increases the elite's sensitivity to their country's international standing, which creates incentives for incumbents to avoid egregious abuse and maintain their power via credible political institutions. Such a strategy may succeed when oppositions are weak; however, under-utilization of coercive capacity creates space for opposition activity, and when strong opposition challenges emerge, governments may be trapped by their efforts to maintain international credibility. Unwilling to pay the external and domestic costs of repression, they may be forced to accept defeat and abandon power.

Where linkage is lower, regime outcomes are driven largely by domestic factors. In the absence of extensive linkage, government abuse is less likely to gain international attention or trigger an external punitive response. Even where punitive action is taken, it is rarely sustained and is less likely to trigger substantial opposition at home. As long as incumbents avoid massive repression or fraud, they enjoy considerable room to maneuver.

The second step of the argument thus centers on the *organizational power of incumbents*. In low-linkage cases, high organizational power should bring authoritarian stability. Where incumbents possess strong state and/or party organizations, they are well equipped to contain elite conflict and thwart opposition challenges, both in the streets and at the ballot box. Governments are often able to pre-empt serious opposition challenges; when such challenges arise, they possess the cohesion and the coercive power to withstand or repress them. Where organizational power is high, then, competitive authoritarian regimes should survive even in a context of high leverage.

Where organizational power is low, competitive authoritarian regimes are less stable. Incumbents are vulnerable to elite defection and frequently ill-equipped to thwart even modest opposition protest or electoral challenges. In such cases, due to the weakness of both progovernment and antigovernment forces, regime outcomes are often fluid and contingent.

In this context, *Western leverage* – the third step in the argument – may be decisive. Where leverage is low, even relatively weak incumbents are likely to survive, for they will encounter limited external democratizing pressure. Where leverage is high, governments that lack organizational power will be vulnerable even to weak opposition challenges. In such a context, the probability of turnover is high, which creates an opportunity for democratization.[201] Where successor governments under-utilize power or undertake reforms to level the playing field, democracies may emerge. However, in the absence of linkage, transitions characterized by weak states, parties, and civil societies create numerous opportunities for incumbent abuse. Hence, turnover is more likely to result in a new competitive authoritarian government. More generally, given the difficulty of consolidating

[201] Along these lines, van de Walle (2003: 307–308) argues that in sub-Saharan Africa, democratic outcomes are more likely when party systems are fragmented and governing parties are weak, as in Benin and Mali.



FIGURE 2.2. Linkage, organizational power, and regime outcomes.

any form of rule – democratic or authoritarian – in a context of party and state weakness, the most likely outcome is a pattern of *unstable authoritarianism*.

The predictions generated by our theory are summarized in Figure 2.2. As shown in the figure, we expect all high-linkage cases to democratize, regardless of organizational power and leverage. Where linkage is not high, we expect high organizational power to bring authoritarian stability. Finally, we expect cases of low and medium organizational power to hinge on Western leverage: Where leverage is high, we predict turnover (but not democratization); where leverage is medium or low, we predict regime survival. Cases of medium organizational power and high leverage generate the most difficult prediction. Such cases, which typically are established civilian regimes governed by patronage-based machines, should be more stable than those of low organizational power. However, we predict regime instability because although such regimes are often stable during normal times, they are vulnerable to crisis – and some type of crisis (e.g., economic or succession) was likely during the 18-year period covered by this study.

Two potential methodological concerns are worth addressing. First, it may be argued that linkage is endogenous to political regimes. For example, Western powers may establish closer ties to democratizing regimes. Likewise, nondemocracies may reduce linkage by placing restrictions on travel, international media, and INGOs. Although states' behavior undoubtedly affects linkage, our treatment of linkage as exogenous and fixed is defensible on several grounds. Most important, linkage is a slow-moving variable. Levels of migration, education abroad, cross-border communication, and even trade and investment most often are rooted in historical factors such as geography, economic development,

and long-term geopolitical alliances, and thereby tend not to change dramatically over the short term. Furthermore, linkage consists of a wide array of ties. Countries rarely experience significant shifts along multiple dimensions simultaneously, and short-term fluctuations in any single area (e.g., trade) are unlikely to alter substantially a country's overall linkage score. Finally, although closed regimes (e.g., Burma and North Korea) may reduce linkage, competitive authoritarian regimes usually do not. Even the most repressive competitive authoritarian regimes generally avoided behavior (e.g., expelling Western media and NGOs, restricting foreign investment, or limiting travel and communication to the West) that would have a significant effect on linkage.[202] Indeed, few of the regimes examined in this study were subject to long-term or encompassing Western isolation. Even where Western sanctions were applied, however (e.g., Nicaragua and Serbia), levels of overall linkage remained high.

A second methodological issue concerns our organizational power variable. Incumbent organizational power may be viewed as an overly proximate cause of regime outcomes and perhaps even a source of tautology. If an incumbent's fall from power were taken as evidence of weakness, or if an incumbent's survival were taken as evidence of strength, then the argument indeed would be tautological. To avoid tautology, we use clear *ex ante* indicators of organizational power that are analytically distinct from – and chronologically prior to – the performance of state and party organizations during the period under study. These indicators are easily distinguishable from regime outcomes. Indeed, the fact that several of our high-organizational-power cases experienced turnover (e.g., high linkage cases such as Guyana, Mexico, Nicaragua, Serbia, Slovakia, and Taiwan) makes it clear that outcomes are not being used to measure organizational power.

From a theoretical standpoint, organizational power is a structural and slow-moving variable. Powerful coercive and party structures rarely emerge or disappear overnight, and they are almost never the product of short-term crafting or institutional design. As the extensive literature shows, strong states and parties are often rooted in previous periods of conflict and mobilization.[203] Indeed, in nearly all of our cases of high organizational power, incumbents inherited structures that were forged during earlier conflicts or regimes.[204] In Malaysia and Zimbabwe, governments inherited a powerful security apparatus built up by colonial or settler regimes[205]; in Belarus and Russia, governments inherited the Soviet intelligence and security apparatus; and in Armenia and Taiwan, a powerful coercive apparatus emerged from large-scale military conflict or threat. Where incumbents inherited weak state apparatuses (e.g., Albania, Benin, Georgia, Haiti, and Malawi), they had to build coercive capacity from scratch – an exceedingly difficult task. Similarly, the strongest parties examined in this study emerged

[202] Where such behavior occurred in our cases (e.g., Belarus, Russia, and Zimbabwe), it did so only at the tail end of the period under study – as regimes were closing.

[203] See Huntington (1968, 1970), Shefter (1977, 1994), Skocpol (1979), Cohen, Brown, and Organski (1981), Tilly (1985, 1992), Smith (2005), and Slater (2010).

[204] Slater (2010) offers an excellent analysis of how early periods of conflict shaped state-building processes in Southeast Asia.

[205] Weitzer (1990); Stubbs (1997).

from intense mobilization and conflict, including revolution (e.g., Nicaragua), liberation movements (e.g., Mozambique and Zimbabwe), and civil war (e.g., Mozambique and Taiwan).[206] These conditions are not easily replicated. Party-building is costly and time-consuming; sitting executives, who can make use of state resources (and who are often averse to independent power centers) have little incentive to invest in it.[207] This is particularly true in the contemporary period, in which mass media often substitute for party organization.[208] Thus, where incumbents did not inherit strong party structures – as in much of Africa and the former Soviet Union – governing parties were almost invariably weak. Far from a proximate cause of regime outcomes, then, organizational power is a historically rooted phenomenon that is rarely subject to dramatic short-term change.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Before proceeding to the case analyses, it is worth examining alternative approaches that explain competitive authoritarian regime trajectories; specifically, we examine economic, institutionalist, and leadership-centered approaches.

Economic Explanations: Modernization, Inequality, and Economic Performance

One set of alternative explanations focuses on socioeconomic variables; prominent among these is economic modernization.[209] It may be hypothesized, for example, that the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes will be more likely in wealthier societies with higher levels of education, larger middle and/or working classes, and more developed civil societies. Indeed, socioeconomic development contributed to democratization in two of our cases: Mexico and Taiwan. Yet the overall utility of modernization theory in this study is limited, which is due in part to the nature of our sample. Scholars generally agree that the relationship between development and democracy is clearest at high levels of development: Wealthy industrialized countries are likely to become (or remain) democratic. However, as shown in Table 2.2, all of our cases except Taiwan were classified by the World Bank as either low- or middle-income countries in 1991. In none of these cases would level of development lead scholars to confidently predict the installation and/or survival of democracy.[210] It is not surprising that regime outcomes among low- and middle-income cases varied considerably.[211]

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[206] On the relationship between party strength and previous periods of conflict, see Smith (2005).

[207] Zolberg (1966: 125); Shefter (1977, 1994).

[208] Levitsky and Cameron (2003).

[209] For various interpretations of the relationship between economic development and democracy, see Lipset (1959/1981), Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Boix (2003), and Boix and Stokes (2003).

[210] Przeworski and Limongi (1997); Geddes (1999: 118–19).

[211] Economic development may *indirectly* shape competitive authoritarian regime outcomes in two ways. First, it enhances

TABLE 2.2. *Economic Development and Competitive Authoritarian Regime Outcomes (World Bank Classifications Based on Per Capita GNP in 1992)*

	Stable Authoritarianism	**Unstable Authoritarianism**	**Democracy**
Low Income	Cambodia Mozambique Tanzania Zimbabwe	Haiti Kenya Madagascar Malawi Zambia	Benin Ghana Guyana Mali Nicaragua
Middle Income	Armenia Botswana Cameroon Gabon Malaysia Russia	Albania Belarus Georgia Moldova Senegal	Croatia Dominican Republic Macedonia Mexico Peru Romania Serbia Slovakia Ukraine
Upper Income			Taiwan

Source: 1994 World Bank World Development Report, pp. 251–2.

A second socioeconomic explanation centers on the role of income inequality.[212] For example, Carles Boix argues that because the redistributive demands of the poor are greater in highly unequal societies, elite resistance to democracy (which presumably allows poor majorities to tax the rich) will be greatest when inequality is high. Thus, competitive authoritarian regimes should be more likely to democratize in countries with lower levels of inequality. However, there are reasons to expect the impact of inequality to be limited. First, in much of the developing and post-communist world, nondemocratic regimes often did not represent the interests of the wealthy, as assumed in the models employed by Boix and others.[213] Many competitive authoritarian regimes were leftist or populist in origin, represented lower-class constituencies, and

opposition capacity. Capitalist development strengthens civil society (Lipset 1959/1981; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). It is therefore not surprising that strong opposition movements emerged in Mexico and Taiwan during the 1990s or that opposition forces remained weak in poor, rural countries such as Cambodia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, and Tanzania. Second, development often enhances linkage. Capitalist development increases economic integration, cross-border communication, travel, education, and more extensive ties to transnational civil society, all of which raise the cost of authoritarianism. Thus, relatively industrialized countries such as Malaysia and Taiwan are more closely linked to the West than is Cambodia. Hence, although level of development is less helpful than linkage or organizational powers in explaining post–Cold War competitive authoritarian regime outcomes, modernization's long-term effects are important. We thank Susan Stokes for highlighting this point.

[212] Boix (2003); Acemoglu and Robinson (2005).

[213] See Pepinsky (2009b).

TABLE 2.3. *Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom Scores: Stable Competitive Authoritarian Regimes versus Democratizers (Average Annual Scores 1995–2008)*

	Fiscal Freedom (Tax burden)	Overall Score
Stable Competitive Authoritarian Regimes (*)	74.5	56.1
Democratizers: Before Transition (**)	71.1	55.7
Democratizers: After Transition	75.6	59.2

Notes:
Index is 0–100 (100 = most freedom)
* Armenia, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Gabon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Russia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
** Benin, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Macedonia, Mali, Mexico, Peru, Romania, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. Guyana and Nicaragua are excluded because they democratized prior to 1995, the first year for which Heritage Foundation data are available. Serbia is excluded due to lack of data.
Source: Heritage Foundation Index Of Economics Freedom (online: www.heritage.org/index/explore.aspx).

embraced redistribution.[214] Second, global financial integration limited states' policy-making autonomy in the post–Cold War period, particularly in developing countries.[215] In a context of high capital mobility, the cost of redistribution was such that even democratically elected governments had strong incentives to avoid it.[216] Hence, even in highly unequal societies, the wealthy had little to fear from democratization.

A brief examination of our cases suggests that democratization did not impose a greater burden on the wealthy. Table 2.3 compares the average annual Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom scores among our cases of stable competitive authoritarianism and cases of democratization, both before and after the transition. As shown in the table, there is no evidence of a relationship between democratization and either "fiscal freedom" (which measures tax burden) or overall economic freedom. Hence, democratization in these cases does not appear to have posed a threat to the economic interests of the wealthy. This is true even in cases of extreme inequality. Six of our democratizers consistently had a GINI score of greater than 0.40 during the 1990s: the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru. In all six cases, overall Economic Freedom scores were higher in 2008 than they had been in 1995. The absence of a relationship between democratization and redistribution – even in highly unequal countries – suggests that income inequality is not an important causal factor in shaping competitive authoritarian regime outcomes.

[214] Examples include Cambodia, Guyana, Haiti, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Serbia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.
[215] Mosley (2003); Wibbels (2006).
[216] Boix (2003) himself highlights the role of capital mobility in reducing elite fears of democracy.

A third socioeconomic approach focuses on economic performance. Economic growth is widely cited as an important factor in shaping regime stability.[217] Economic crises tend to undermine authoritarian regimes by eroding public support, triggering mass protest, or sapping governments of resources needed to distribute patronage and/or finance the coercive apparatus.[218] Economic growth is likely to bolster public support and expand the resources available for patronage and public-sector salaries. Following this logic, competitive authoritarian regimes with healthy economies should be most stable, whereas those that fail to deliver economic growth should be vulnerable to collapse.

Although these arguments have much validity, economic booms and crises do not affect all regimes equally[219]; rather, their impact is mediated by organizational power and linkage. For example, the political effects of economic crises may be blunted in regimes with extensive organizational power. Where state and party cohesion are high, incumbents often possess the wherewithal to prevent elite defection, crack down on protest, and win (or steal) elections even in the face of widespread voter dissatisfaction. Thus, in Nicaragua, the Sandinista regime survived a 33 percent decline in gross domestic product (GDP) during the mid-1980s; in Armenia, the Ter-Petrosian government survived a 60 percent economic contraction in 1992–1993; and, as of mid-2010 the Mugabe government had survived Zimbabwe's spectacular post-2000 economic collapse. Each of these governments could rely on cohesive state and (in Nicaragua and Zimbabwe) party structures forged during periods of intense military conflict. In general, it is only where state and party cohesion are low that fiscal crisis undermines discipline within the security forces, the withdrawal of patronage resources triggers elite defection, and autocratic governments succumb easily to protest (e.g., Albania in 1997 and Madagascar in 2002), armed rebellion (e.g., Georgia in 1992 and Haiti in 2004), or electoral defeat (e.g., Zambia in 1991 and Belarus, Malawi, and Ukraine in 1994).

The benefits of economic growth also are mediated by organizational power. A growing economy clearly makes life easier for autocrats, but where organizational power is low, it is often not sufficient to sustain them. Thus, in Madagascar (2002, 2009), Mali (2002), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004), intra-elite conflict – in the absence of a strong governing party – and/or the disintegration of a weak coercive apparatus brought down incumbents despite high growth rates.

Finally, linkage also mediates the impact of economic growth. Where linkage is extensive, the external cost of fraud and repression remains high no matter what the growth rate. Thus, in several high-linkage cases, incumbents undertook

[217] See Bermeo (1990: 366–7), Huntington (1991: 50–8), Haggard and Kaufman (1995), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Geddes (1999), and Przeworski et al. (2000). In their analyses of postwar regime outcomes, Przeworski et al. (2000) found that growth rates were positively associated with the stability of both democratic and authoritarian regimes.

[218] There is little question, for example, that economic crises contributed to the liberalization or collapse of many Africa autocracies in the early 1990s (Herbst 1994).

[219] See Smith (2006) and Pepinsky (2009b).

democratizing reforms (Mexico, and Taiwan) or lost power (Slovakia, Taiwan, and Romania) despite growing economies.

In summary, economic performance clearly affects regime stability, but its impact is mediated by organizational power and linkage. Where linkage is high or organizational power is low, autocratic incumbents are often vulnerable even when growth rates are high. Where organizational power is high and linkage is low, autocrats often survive even in the face of severe economic crisis.

Institutional Design

Another alternative approach focuses on institutional design. During the past two decades, a vast literature examined how constitutional and other formal institutional arrangements shape post–Cold War regime outcomes. For example, drawing on earlier work by Juan Linz and others,[220] scholars of post–Cold War hybrid regimes link presidentialism – and in particular, powerful presidencies – to nondemocratic outcomes.[221] Thus, according to Steven Fish, *super-presidentialism* – defined as a "constitutional arrangement that invests greater power in the presidency and much less power in the legislature" – has "inhibited democratization" in Russia and other post-Communist countries by undermining accountability and inhibiting the emergence of strong institutions, parties, and experienced political elites.[222] Along somewhat different lines, Timothy Colton and Cindy Skach point to *semi-presidentialism* as a cause of Russia's slide into authoritarianism. In their view, semi-presidential systems are prone to interbranch conflict and immobilism, which create incentives for presidents to "dominate the political process and rule by decree," which places regimes on a "slippery slope to dictatorship."[223] Finally, several studies have highlighted the role of constitutional courts, electoral commissions, and other institutions in deterring or blocking autocratic abuse.[224]

We find institutional design to be of limited utility in explaining post–Cold War regime outcomes. From an empirical standpoint, there is no clear relationship between constitutional design and competitive authoritarian regime outcomes. Among our cases, 13 of 29 presidential or semi-presidential regimes democratized between 1990 and 2008, compared to only 1 of 6 parliamentary regimes.[225] Among high-linkage cases, all presidential regimes democratized.

More generally, there is reason to be skeptical about the impact of the institutional design in competitive authoritarian regimes. Institutionalist analyses hinge

[220] See Linz (1990), Stepan and Skach (1993), and Linz and Valenzuela (1994).

[221] Reynolds (1999); Fish (2001a, 2005, 2006).

[222] Fish (2005: 248–50).

[223] Colton and Skach (2005: 116–17).

[224] See, for example, Ganev (2001: 194–6), Elklit and Reynolds (2002), and Horowitz (2006).

[225] Cases of presidentialism and semi-presidentialism that democratized are Benin, Croatia, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Taiwan, and Ukraine. Among parliamentary systems, Slovakia democratized, but Albania, Belarus (1992–1994), Botswana, Cambodia, and Malaysia did not.

on the assumption that formal institutions are (1) regularly enforced, and (2) minimally stable.[226] In other words, they take for granted that parchment rules actually constrain actors in practice. Indeed, it is only under these conditions that institutional design can be expected to have a significant independent effect on regime outcomes. Although these assumptions hold up relatively well in the advanced industrialized democracies, they travel less well to other parts of the world.[227] Indeed, a striking characteristic of many competitive authoritarian regimes is the extent of sheer institutional weakness.

In most competitive authoritarian regimes, for example, formal institutions are highly unstable. The Russian constitution was changed nearly four hundred times between 1992 and 1993.[228] In Madagascar, constitutional arrangements have been "tampered with so much . . . as to be unrecognizable"[229]; consequently, constitutional rules "functioned less as a constraint on the behavior of elites than as the object of elite manipulation."[230] In Malaysia, the governing UMNO could "change the constitution at will,"[231] and even ex–Prime Minister Mahathir complained that the "frequency and trivial reasons for altering the constitution" had reduced it to a "useless scrap of paper."[232]

Competitive authoritarian regimes also are characterized by weak enforcement of formal rules. For example, although Mexico's 1917 constitution formally prescribed a weak executive, a strong legislature, and an independent Supreme Court, in practice, PRI presidents enjoyed vast "metaconstitutional" powers that reduced Congress to a "rubber stamp."[233] Democratic provisions in Peru's 1993 constitution "were transformed into facades"[234]; in Cambodia, many constitutional provisions remained "dead letters"[235]; and in Romania, politics was characterized by the "nonobservance of the Constitution, its letter, its spirit, and its guarantees."[236] Such constitutions routinely fail to constrain powerful executives. Thus, in Croatia, "the problem [was] not that the president ha[d] strong constitutional powers but that [President] Tuđman [was] going beyond them."[237] In Haiti, "no head of state has felt constrained by constitutions, even his own."[238]

In most competitive authoritarian regimes, formal rules and agencies designed to constrain governments were frequently circumvented, manipulated, or dismantled by those governments. In Belarus, President Lukashenka paid no attention as the Constitutional Court cited him for violating the Constitution 16 times in his first 2 years in office. In Gabon, the nominally independent electoral commission created during the 1990s "proved neither autonomous nor competent"[239]; in 1998, many of its functions were unconstitutionally transferred back to the

[226] Levitsky and Murillo (2009).
[227] See Huntington (1968) and Levitsky and Murillo (2009).
[228] Filatov (2001: 180).
[229] Marcus (2004: 2).
[230] Marcus (2005: 156).
[231] Crouch (1996b: 115).
[232] Quoted in Lee (1995: 109).
[233] Eisenstadt (2004: 40). See also Weldon (1997).
[234] Degregori (2000: 377).
[235] Jennar (1995: 2).
[236] Weber (2001: 213).
[237] *Uncaptive Minds* (1994: 41).
[238] Weinstein and Segal (1992: 62).
[239] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World 2004: Gabon." (online: www.freedomhouse.org)

Interior Ministry.[240] In Malawi, when Electoral Commission Chair, Anastazia Msosa, asserted her independence in 1998, the Muluzi government "promptly removed her" and then packed the commission with allies.[241] In Peru, after the newly created Constitutional Tribunal (TC) ruled against President Fujimori's bid for a third term in 1997, the pro-Fujimori Congress sacked three TC members, leaving the country's highest constitutional authority dormant for three years.

The failure of formal institutions to constrain executives also is seen in the case of presidential term limits. Although term limits were imposed throughout much of Africa during the first half of the 1990s, Bruce Baker observes that "in political circles across the continent the talk is of altering constitutions to allow [Presidents] to stay on for a longer term, another term or for an unlimited number of terms."[242] In Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Namibia, Niger, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, presidents modified or eliminated constitutional term limits to extend their stay in office.[243] Term limits were similarly sidestepped or overturned in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Peru, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Venezuela.

Where formal rules do not effectively constrain powerful actors, they are unlikely to have a significant independent effect on regime outcomes. Indeed, the causal story is often reversed: Rather than shaping regime outcomes, formal institutional arrangements are frequently endogenous to those outcomes.[244] For example, although presidentialism may contribute to democratic breakdown in some cases, it has frequently been imposed by regimes that were *already authoritarian*. In postcolonial Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, the consolidation of autocratic power preceded – and surely facilitated – shifts from parliamentary to presidential constitutions. In Zimbabwe, for example, Westminster parliamentarism was replaced by presidentialism *after* violent repression of opposition had created a "de facto one party state."[245] Guyana underwent a similar change only *after* the Burnham government had "ruthlessly suppressed" opposition.[246]

Similarly, many contemporary super-presidentialist constitutions were products – rather than causes – of authoritarianism. Thus, throughout much of post-communist Eurasia, autocratic governments imposed highly presidentialist systems *after* they had concentrated power.[247] Russia's super-presidentialist 1993 constitution was drawn up only after Yeltsin had closed the legislature in a presidential coup; Belarus' highly presidentialist constitution was imposed after Lukashenka had emasculated the legislature and constitutional court; and Romania's strong presidency was created after the ruling National Salvation Front had consolidated power and violently put down opposition protest.[248] Likewise, Peru's 1993 constitution, which expanded presidential power, was drawn up

[240] Gardinier (2000: 236).
[241] Patel (2002: 157).
[242] Baker (2002: 286).
[243] See Baker (2002) and S. Brown (2003: 329).
[244] Easter (1997).
[245] Nordlund (1996: 153–4).
[246] Premdas (1994: 48).
[247] In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, super-presidentialist constitutions were imposed by leaders who had already monopolized political control by the time Mikhail Gorbachev introduced semi-competitive elections in 1990.
[248] Sellin (2004: 122–4).

after Alberto Fujimori's 1992 coup had closed Congress and dissolved the old constitution.[249] At the same time, stronger parliaments may be a product – rather than a cause – of democratization. Thus, in Croatia, parliament and the judiciary were strengthened after opposition forces had removed the autocratic Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) from power.[250]

We are not making a general claim that formal institutions do not matter. Rather, the impact of institutions – that is, the degree to which formal rules actually shape expectations and constrain behavior – varies across cases. Where formal institutions are regularly enforced and minimally stable, the causal power of institutional design may be considerable. In much of the developing world, however, formal institutions are weak: Rather than constraining political elites, they are routinely circumvented and manipulated by them; rather than structuring the political game and determining winners and losers, they are repeatedly restructured by the winners at the expense of the losers. In such cases, the independent causal power of formal institutions is limited.

The Role of Leadership

A third alternative approach to explaining competitive authoritarian regime outcomes centers on contingency and leadership. During the 1980s and 1990s, democratization in countries with seemingly formidable structural obstacles triggered a paradigm shift in regime studies. Following the influential work of Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, scholars began to treat transitions as periods of extraordinary uncertainty, in which contingent events and the choices of political elites could be decisive in shaping regime outcomes.[251] Many of these scholars highlighted the role of leadership in "crafting" successful transitions.[252] For example, Fish pointed to Mongolia's democratization as a "triumph of choice, will, leadership, agency, and contingency over structure, history, culture, and geography."[253] Along similar lines, scholars attributed nondemocratic outcomes to either "poor elite decisions" or contingent events.[254] Other scholars stressed the importance of political leaders' commitment to democracy and compromise.[255]

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[249] Conaghan (2005: 57–8).

[250] *RFE/RL Newsline* November 10, 2000 (online: http://www.rferl.org/archive/en-newsline/latest/683/683.html). Observers have often noted that all eight of the Eastern European countries admitted to the EU in 2004 (i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and Lithuania) had either parliamentary systems or presidential systems with weak presidencies (Stepan 2005; Colton and Skach 2005: 123). Yet, in seven of the eight countries, institutional design and full democratization were implemented simultaneously immediately following the collapse of Soviet rule – suggesting that constitutional design and democratization may have been the product of a common prior factor.

[251] See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Przeworski (1986), Di Palma (1990), Karl (1990), and Higley and Gunther (1992).

[252] O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Di Palma (1990); Fish (1998).

[253] Fish (1998: 140).

[254] Moser (2001a: 10); see also McFaul (2001) and Tanaka (2005).

[255] Fish (1998); Gros (1998a: 4–7); McFaul (2002).

Leadership obviously affects regime outcomes, particularly in the short run. It is difficult to understand the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in Serbia, Slovakia, and Venezuela, for example, without reference to the committed, risk-taking leadership of Milošević, Mečiar, and Chavez. At the same time, surprising levels of pluralism in Russia in the 1990s and Ukraine after 2004 were rooted in part in the unusual tolerance of incumbents. Leaders also vary considerably in their will to face down – violently, if necessary – mass protest. In this sense, Hun Sen in Cambodia and Mugabe in Zimbabwe differed markedly from Zedillo in Mexico and Kaunda in Zambia.

However, evidence suggests that over time, leadership is less important than international and domestic structural variables in shaping competitive authoritarian regime trajectories. The distribution of regime outcomes during the post–Cold War period, in fact, was much more structured than the early transitions literature would lead us to expect. Widespread democratization in the Americas and Eastern Europe, and considerably less democratization in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union, suggest that – unless we are prepared to believe that leaders in the former regions were exceptionally skilled democrats – regime outcomes were not particularly open to contingency and leadership choice.

Indeed, our case analyses suggest that leaders' choices often are heavily structured by the domestic and international context in which they operate. In numerous cases, erstwhile authoritarian leaders (e.g., Iliescu, Kaunda, Kérékou, and Rawlings) and parties (e.g., the Nicaraguan FSLN, Mexican PRI, Taiwanese KMT, and Croatian HDZ) behaved democratically, allowing free elections and leaving power peacefully. At the same time, a striking number of "democratic" opposition leaders – including Sali Berisha in Albania, Levon Ter-Petrosian in Armenia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia, Vladimir Mečiar in Slovakia, Bakili Muluzi in Malawi, and Frederick Chiluba in Zambia – governed in a nondemocratic manner after coming to power.

Even when leaders' behavior had important short-term effects, the effects frequently did not endure much beyond that leader's tenure in office. Thus, Yeltsin's tolerance of opposition and media pluralism during the 1990s did little to prevent Putin's subsequent authoritarian crackdown. Similarly, the relatively benign rule of Viacheslau Kebich in Belarus (1992–1994) quickly gave way to Lukashenka's autocratic regime. Likewise, abuse of democratic procedure by Tuđman in Croatia, Balaguer in the Dominican Republic, and Mečiar in Slovakia in the mid-1990s did little to prevent their successors from consolidating democratic rule immediately after coming to power. Hence, with a few exceptions, leadership generally has had only a marginal impact on longer-term competitive authoritarian regime outcomes.

It is more useful, therefore, to assume that incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes seek to maintain their power, using both democratic and – when available – nondemocratic means. What determines whether these leaders behave democratically, therefore, is not so much their beliefs as the opportunities and constraints that confront them. Where leaders possess effective coercive apparatuses and few international constraints, as in Belarus, Malaysia, Russia, and

Zimbabwe, they generally use those instruments to govern autocratically – especially when their power is at stake. By contrast, where leaders lack a strong coercive apparatus (Benin, Georgia, Moldova in the 1990s, and Ukraine under Kravchuk) and/or face heavy international constraints (Mexico, Nicaragua, Romania, and Taiwan), their behavior is more likely to be consistent with democratic norms.

CONCLUSION: A STRUCTURALIST ARGUMENT

Our study is more structuralist than most analyses of contemporary regimes. Whereas research on 19th-century, interwar, and postwar regime patterns routinely focuses on structural variables,[256] most explanations of third- and fourth-wave regime outcomes center on contingency, elite choice, and institutional design.[257] Although our study focuses on post–Cold War regimes, it assigns less causal weight to contingency and leadership. Instead, our argument centers on factors that are rooted in long-term historical processes – and that are not easily changed by individual leaders. At the international level, linkage to the West (with the partial exception of EU-led integration) is less the product of elite decisions than of geography, economic development, colonialism, and long-standing geostrategic alliances. Similarly, at the domestic level, strong coercive and party organizations are rarely the product of short-term crafting or institutional design.

Post–Cold War regime outcomes are far more patterned than contingency, choice-centered, and institutional design approaches would suggest. Two structural factors – that is, linkage to the West and incumbent organizational power – go a long way toward explaining variation in the trajectory of post–Cold War competitive authoritarian regimes. We examine these cases in the chapters that follow.

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[256] See Lipset (1959/1981), Moore (1966), O'Donnell (1973), Skocpol (1979), Collier and Collier (1991), Luebbert (1991), Przeworski et al. (2000), Boix (2003), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005).

[257] See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Di Palma (1990), Fish (1998, 2005), McFaul (2001, 2002), Bunce and Wolchik (2006a, 2006b), Howard and Roessler (2006), and Beissinger (2007). An exception is the literature on oil-based regimes (cf. Ross 2001).